Article View: fa.tcp-ip
Article #402voting on the time
From: tcp-ip
Date: Tue, 20 Aug 1985 20:58
Date: Tue, 20 Aug 1985 20:58
18 lines
1506 bytes
1506 bytes
From: David C. Plummer in disguise <DCP@SCRC-QUABBIN.ARPA>
Date: Tue, 20 Aug 85 12:19:13 EDT
From: Christopher C. Stacy <CSTACY@MIT-MC.ARPA>
When voting on the time, another piece of information which almost
everyone has at their disposal is the reference date of certain files
which must be accessed when the system is run. This can be used as an
error check against the propogation of bad times (which has happenned
occasionally on our local network). Network (or other) times preceeding
the file date are probably bogus.
But what happens if somebody spazzes and warps MIT-MC 9 months into the
future. (It has happened before.) What if one of the files you check
against was created by such a time-warped machine? Indeed, the normal
case will be caught by your probable-bogosity meter, but when the
baseline is bogus, then what? What about systems who can't access the
filesystem until the time is known?
Technical Details
Message-ID:
<10027@ucbvax.ARPA>Path:
arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!utzoo!linus!philabs!prls!amdimage!amdcad!decwrl!ucbvax!daemonShow Full Headers
Complete Article Headers
Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.3 4.3bsd-beta 6/6/85; site ucbvax.ARPA Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!utzoo!linus!philabs!prls!amdimage!amdcad!decwrl!ucbvax!daemon From: tcp-ip@ucbvax.ARPA Newsgroups: fa.tcp-ip Subject: voting on the time Message-ID: <10027@ucbvax.ARPA> Date: Tue, 20-Aug-85 16:58:35 EDT Article-I.D.: ucbvax.10027 Posted: Tue Aug 20 16:58:35 1985 Date-Received: Fri, 23-Aug-85 08:36:59 EDT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.ARPA Organization: University of California at Berkeley Lines: 18