🚀 go-pugleaf

Our MIT campus networking offie just passed along this security
alert pertaining to HP-UX machines. Since so many HP/Apollo users
have mixed networks now, I thought I'd pass this along


	From hoffmann@MIT.EDU Sat Jan 23 10:30:16 1993
	Received: from MIT.EDU (MIT.MIT.EDU) by quake.mit.edu id AA03003g; Sat, 23 Jan 93 10:30:15 EST
	Received: from PADDINGTON.MIT.EDU by MIT.EDU with SMTP
		id AA22668; Sat, 23 Jan 93 10:24:40 EST
	From: hoffmann@MIT.EDU
	Received: by Paddington (5.57/4.7) id AA11905; Sat, 23 Jan 93 10:24:39 -0500
	Date: Sat, 23 Jan 93 10:24:39 -0500
	Message-Id: <9301231524.AA11905@Paddington>
	To: netusers@MIT.EDU (MITnet Users)
	Subject: [Revised Hewlett-Packard NIS ypbind Vulnerability]
	Status: R

				RESTRICTIONS: NONE 

	          _____________________________________________________
	              The Computer Incident Advisory Capability
	                          ___  __ __    _     ___
	                         /       |     / \   /
	                         \___  __|__  /___\  \___ 
	          _____________________________________________________
	                          Information Bulletin

	             Revised Hewlett-Packard NIS ypbind Vulnerability

	January 22, 1993, 1400 PST		   	              Number D-05

	_________________________________________________________________________
	PROBLEM:   Allows unauthorized access to NIS data.
	PLATFORM:  HP/UX Operating System for series 300, 700, and 800 computers.
	DAMAGE:    Remote and local users can obtain unauthorized privileges.
	SOLUTION:  Install revised patches. 
	_________________________________________________________________________
	          Critical Information about Hewlett-Packard NIS ypbind

	The inclosed advisory was issued by the Computer Emergency Response
	Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC) and is an update to a previous
	advisory CA-92:17.

	=============================================================================
	CA-93:01                         CERT Advisory
	                               January 13, 1993
	                Revised Hewlett-Packard NIS ypbind Vulnerability

	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

	                   *** THIS IS A REVISED CERT ADVISORY ***
	   *** IT CONTAINS NEW INFORMATION REGARDING AVAILABILITY OF IMAGE KITS ***
	                  *** SUPERSEDES CERT ADVISORY CA-92:17 ***

	The CERT Coordination Center has received information concerning a
	vulnerability in the NIS ypbind module for the Hewlett-Packard (HP)
	HP/UX Operating System for series 300, 700, and 800 computers. 

	HP has provided revised patches for all of the HP/UX level 8 releases
	(8.0, 8.02, 8.06, and 8.07).  This problem is fixed in HP/UX 9.0.
	The following patches have been superseded:

	              Patch ID        Replaced by Patch ID
	              PHNE_1359       PHNE_1706
	              PHNE_1360       PHNE_1707
	              PHNE_1361       PHNE_1708

	All HP NIS clients and servers running ypbind should obtain and 
	install the patch appropriate for their machine's architecture
	as described below.

	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

	I.   Description

	     A vulnerability in HP NIS allows unauthorized access to NIS data.

	II.  Impact

	     Root on a remote host running any vendor's implementation of NIS
	     can gain root access on any local host running HP's NIS ypbind. 
	     Local users of a host running HP's NIS ypbind can also gain root access.

	III. Solution
	        
	     1) All HP NIS clients and servers running ypbind should obtain and 
	        install the patch appropriate for their machine's architecture.

	        These patches contain a version of ypbind that accepts ypset
	        requests only from a superuser port on the local host.  This prevents
	        a non-superuser program from sending rogue ypset requests to ypbind.
	        The patches also include the mod from the superseded patches that 
	        prevents a superuser on a remote system from issuing a ypset -h 
	        command to the local system and binding the system to a rogue ypserver.

	        These patches may be obtained from HP via FTP (this is NOT
	        anonymous FTP) or the HP SupportLine.  To obtain HP security
	        patches, you must first register with the HP SupportLine.
	        The registration instructions are available via anonymous FTP at
	        cert.org (192.88.209.5) in the file
		            "pub/vendors/hp/supportline_and_patch_retrieval".
	        The new patch files are:

	     Architecture Patch ID   Filename                               Checksum
	     ------------ --------   --------                               --------
	     Series 300   PHNE_1706  /hp-ux_patches/s300_400/8.X/PHNE_1706  38955 212
	     Series 700   PHNE_1707  /hp-ux_patches/s700/8.X/PHNE_1707        815 311
	     Series 800   PHNE_1708  /hp-ux_patches/s800/8.X/PHNE_1708      56971 299

	     2) The instructions for installing the patch are provided in the
	        PHNE_xxxx.text file (this file is created after the patch has
	        been unpacked).

	        The checksums listed above are for the patch archive files from HP.
	        Once unpacked, each shell archive contains additional checksum 
	        information in the file "patchfilename.text".  This checksum is
	        applicable to the binary patch file "patchfilename.updt".


	If you have any questions about obtaining or installing the patches,
	contact the USA HP SupportLine at 415-691-3888, or your local HP
	SupportLine number.  Please note that the telephone numbers in this
	advisory are appropriate for the USA and Canada. 

	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
	The CERT Coordination Center wishes to thank Brian Kelley of Ford Motor
	Company for bringing this vulnerability to our attention.  We would also
	like to thank Hewlett-Packard for their response to this problem. 
	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
	===========================================================================
	CIAC would like to acknowledge the contributions of: CERT/CC.

	For additional information or assistance, please contact CIAC at
	(510)422-8193/FTS or send E-mail to ciac@llnl.gov. FAX messages to
	(510)423-8002/FTS.

	PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE and ESnet computing
	communities receive CIAC bulletins.  If you are not part of these
	communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
	incidents.  Some of the other teams include the NASA NSI response team,
	DARPA's CERT/CC, NAVCIRT, and the Air Force response team.  Your
	agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response
	and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization.  A list of
	FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained by
	sending email to Docserver@First.Org with a null subject line, and the
	first line of the message reading: send first-contacts.

	This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency
	of the United States Government.  Neither the United States Government
	nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any
	warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or
	responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any
	information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents
	that its use would not infringe privately owned rights.  Reference
	herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by
	trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily
	constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the
	United States Government or the University of California.  The views
	and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or
	reflect those of the United States Government or the University of
	California, and shall not be used for advertising or product
	endorsement purposes.