🚀 go-pugleaf

R. Mellon von Clausewitz Reviews OAF
  26 October 1999

((Straight from the Western Scaifesylvania Military Academy

  << http://www.triblive.com/frames/opinfram.html >>

comes the definitive VRWC strategic account of Secretary Albright's War.
 Surely none of the wingnuts can achieve anything stupider and more
erratic than this unguided missile!))


Lessons of war

The 78-day engagement of Operation Allied Force in Kosovo is a textbook
example of how not to wage a war.

American generals who commanded U.S. troops in the NATO campaign
testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that our NATO
allies placed severe restrictions on our military actions, restrictions
that could have led to unnecessary loss of life.

(("He travels the fastest who travels alone."))

Instead of decisive thrusts to achieve a military objective, American
forces were dispatched into the fray and lumped into an alphabet-soup
confederation that actually hindered the prosecution of the campaign.
Even worse, Bill Clinton committed our military personnel without the
consent of the Senate, violating the spirit, if not the letter, of the
War Powers Act.

((George McGovern! Call your office!))

The incremental policy that we pursued eventually wore down the
resistance of the Belgrade government.  But it also put thousands of
U.S. personnel at risk and depleted the war chest of U.S. forces by
dragging out the engagement for nearly three months.

((Nuke first, ask questions afterwards.  "As you were, George."))

Only the Congress can declare war, and that responsibility is not ceded
to the President or NATO.

NATO is a political alliance, not a military concord, and acknowledging
all of the political peccadilloes of our NATO partners unnecessarily
restricted our forces from waging a winnable campaign.

(("The sun is a large globe, not a hot star, and ...."))

The generals told the senators that military targets had to be reviewed
by each of our NATO partners.  They particularly mentioned France, which
vetoed several targets.  One particular NATO political edict held that
bridges could only be bombed between 10 p.m. and 4 a.m. to avoid
civilian casualties. But that restriction also communicated to opposing
forces when to train their anti-aircraft fire on our pilots.

(("Looking back, general, would you rather have been on the bridge or in
the plane at 0234 hours on the date in question?"))

Air Force Lt. Gen. Michael Short said he wanted to heavily bomb Belgrade
the first day to disable the Yugoslav capital and quickly bring the war
home to premier Slobodan Milosevic. Instead, we didn't target Belgrade
until later in the campaign, emboldening Milosevic.

This is not new.  Generals always want free reign to conduct military
exercises.  But subjugating military judgment [to] the various agendas
of our NATO allies endangers our military and makes a mockery of the
Congress's constitutional responsibility. The testimony delivered in
these congressional hearings ought to prompt our legislators to reaffirm
that duty.

---

  To summarize, gentlebeings: We should have fought alone.  We shouldn't
have fought at all.  We fought too timidly.  We fought so badly we
should have lost.  We should have killed more of them.  They should have
killed more of us.

  To summarize the summary: whatever is Clinton's, is wrong.

  If you like this thoughtful Scaifeite strategizing, no doubt you'll
love the other editorial in today's _Tribune Review_, the Dilbertarian
bouquet for Buchanan.  It's at the same place the above came from.
There are some limits, after all, to the political pornography I am
willing to disseminate.

== Yours, J. H. McDove ==  ... sobie spiewam a Muzom ... ==


Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.