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We have posted a new Monograph at www.publictransit.us, "An Analysis
of Ridership Forecasts for the Los Angeles Metro Red Line: Alternative
Strategies and Future Transit Improvements." This document is in .pdf
format, 243k size.

This report by Leroy W. Demery, Jr. was quite prescient, accurately
predicting current Los Angeles Red Line (subway) patronage. The report
also accurately anticipated current patronage trends on the Los
Angeles Blue Line (light rail) between downtown Los Angeles and Long
Beach.

Here is a summary of the paper: 

An Analysis of Ridership Forecasts for the Los Angeles Metro Red Line:
Alternative Strategies and Future Transit Improvements

June 1997

SUMMARY

--- Ridership carried by the completed Red Line will stabilize well
below the levels forecast prior to the start of construction, and
those currently forecast by the Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority. This will occur because the line cannot
accommodate the peak-period volumes implied by these forecasts, given
the travel patterns typical of U.S. cities and the crowding levels
which consumers are likely to tolerate.

---The Red Line is likely to achieve the highest traffic density
(passenger-miles per route-mile) of any postwar U.S. heavy-rail line.
It may increase the total travel (passenger-miles) carried by the
LACMTA system by more than ten percent.

---The likely ridership ceiling for Red Line, once extended to
Hollywood, is in the range of 100,000 -- 150,000 per weekday, assuming
an adequate peak-period service level. Upon completion to North
Hollywood, the likely ridership ceiling is in the range of 120,000 --
170,000 per weekday, depending on the distribution of ridership
throughout the day and consumer tolerance for peak-period crowding.

---In order to accommodate 200,000 -- 250,000 passengers per weekday,
as currently forecast, LACMTA would have to invest in upgraded
terminal facilities, improved signals, and possibly, automatic train
operation. The current forecasts imply peak-hour volumes exceeding
32,000 pass/hr, far higher than observed in any U.S. city except New
York. Even if such demand does exist, serving it might not be
cost-effective -- just as freeway widening to accommodate all
peak-period demand is not cost-effective.

---Evaluation of Red Line results would have to consider that 1.)
travel-time savings attract more passengers and longer trips to
transit, and 2.) improvements leading to significant increases in
average travel distance may also lead to large operating-cost
increases. The Red Line will generate an LACMTA system-wide travel
(passenger-mile) increase of 6-17 percent -- or more, depending on how
much Red Line travel is "new" -- all concentrated in one corridor. In
order to accomplish this with buses, LACMTA would have to operate
11-16 million more vehicle-miles annually, a 14-21 percent increase
over the 1996 systemwide total -- while managing to provide similar
travel-time reductions. Such alternative service would cost $40-70
million more per year to operate than the Red Line. (All cost
comparisons herein are based on 1996 system performance, and are
expressed in 1996 dollars.)

---An expanded Red Line, reaching Warner Center in the San Fernando
Valley, Whittier/Atlantic in East Los Angeles, Beverly Hills, Century
City, UCLA and Santa Monica would increase LACMTA system travel
(passenger-miles) by roughly 50 percent. Annual operating cost would
be $100-200 million less than bus services achieving the same results.

---The most needed mass transit improvement in Los Angeles is
travel-time reduction. This stems from the large size of the region
and the scattering of employment opportunities miles away from
inner-city residents, who are effectively cordoned off from jobs which
lie beyond the range of tolerable bus commuting. The large potential
market for longer transit trips has been demonstrated since 1990 by
the light-rail Blue Line, which attracts a peak-period average travel
distance greater than ten miles.

---The Red Line will be quite competitive with the 1983-1985 fare
subsidies in terms of additional travel and boardings. Operating cost
for the completed Red Line should fall in the range of $0.25-0.35 per
passenger-mile, compared to $0.80 per passenger-mile generated by the
fare subsidies. Results in terms of boardings also favor the Red Line:
$3.00 per boarding compared to $4.00 per boarding (in today's dollars)
attracted by the 1983-1985 subsidies.

---A ten-percent increase in LACMTA annual bus-miles would generate
about 70,000 additional weekday boardings, at an annual cost of $60
million. The implied cost per boarding, $2.50, is lower than that for
the completed Red Line, but the cost per passenger-mile would be more
than twice the Red Line figure. Successive service increases would not
generate increased ridership in proportion (without other
improvements), and would erode the cost-effectiveness of LACMTA's bus
system.

---Targeted fare subsidies and bus service expansion should be
implemented, but general fare subsidies or large-scale increases in
vehicle mileage are not low-cost "shortcuts" to better transit
service.

--The tradeoffs among busways, light rail and heavy rail include
capital cost, operating cost and ridership ceilings. Busways are
strongly competitive with light rail; they may be implemented in
unconnected stages, as in Ottawa, and so would have a strong advantage
even if capital costs were equivalent. However, busway operating costs
are often underestimated. The lower peak vehicle occupancies carried
by U.S. busway, transitway and HOV services imply that a busway option
would have to provide 40 percent higher peak service levels than a
rail alternative in the same corridor. The reasonable maximum for
light rail in U.S. cities, implying four-car trains every three
minutes during peak periods, is about 8,000 pass/hr, implying about
60,000 pass/weekday. Higher volumes require full grade separation,
which essentially means heavy rail. Busways are not a realistic option
for corridors where anticipated peak volumes exceed this level.

---Ridership estimates for U.S. cities, based on performance of
systems overseas, are likely to be inflated. The fact that individual
heavy-rail lines carry more than one million passengers per day
overseas does not imply that the same facility, duplicated in the
U.S., would provide similar results. Similar examples may be given for
busways and light rail.

---The busway and light-rail options for the Eastside and San Fernando
Valley corridors are feasible alternatives to heavy rail, and could
offer similar travel times. Net capacity, however, would be
considerably less. Busway operating costs would be highest of the
three modes.

---Light rail is probably not feasible in the Westside (Exposition)
corridor without a separate entrance into downtown Los Angeles.
Peak-period traffic potential and experience in other U.S. cities
suggest that the current 7th St/Metro Center Blue Line terminal could
not accommodate traffic from both lines.

---There is no technical reason why future heavy-rail or light rail
lines need include any "subway" alignment. Light rail may be built on
surface streets, as the Blue Line demonstrates. Both heavy rail and
light rail may be built on viaduct, alongside freight railroads and in
retained cuts. However, where heavy-rail capacity is needed, and where
alternative alignments are not available, construction of elevated
structures along major streets may impose unacceptable environmental
impacts. It is difficult to imagine a non-subway alternative to the
currently-funded Red Line, except perhaps over Cahuenga Pass. In
addition, failure to connect the Long Beach and Pasadena Blue Lines
will eventually impose a serious peak-period capacity constraint in
downtown Los Angeles, overloading the Red Line between Union Station
and 7th St/Metro Center.

---Los Angeles residents and community leaders should carefully
consider various strategies for public transportation improvements.
Capital-cost savings may be quickly absorbed by operating-cost
increases. For example, $200 million would purchase 600 buses, which
would cost $200 million per year to operate. Total cost for 600 buses
and four years of operation: $1 billion. Maximum plausible weekday
ridership increase: 200,000 -- 250,000. Service quality improvements,
such as reduced travel times: none.