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In this issue:
* THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT: THE ULTIMATE BRIBE
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               S O M A L I A  N E W S  U P D A T E  

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Vol 2, No 12            March 30, 1993.               ISSN 1103-1999  

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Somalia News Update is published irregularly via electronic mail and 
fax. Questions can be directed to antbh@strix.udac.uu.se or to fax 
number +46-18-151160. All SNU marked material is free to quote as 
long as the source is clearly stated. IPS articles may be reproduced 
7 days after the original story date.
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THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT: THE ULTIMATE BRIBE

(SNU, Uppsala, March 30) The treaty signed on Saturday evening in 
Addis Ababa is to some extent clearer than the verison the SNA 
delegates refused to sign on Wednesday evening. This one lacks the 
extremely complex setup of committees in charge for the appointment 
of other committees etc. It is also reassuring that the territorial 
claim on Somaliland is at least less explicit in this latest version. 
The previous version said that "the Unity and Territorial Integrity 
of the Somali Republic is sacred and non-negotiable" (p.2). The 
previous agreement even stipulated the formation of a special 
committee "composed of all the political organizations to promote a 
dialogue with SNM". In this latest version those phrases are replaced 
by sporadic references to "Somalia as a whole". However, the UN 
bureaucrats responsible for the copy-editing have apparently missed 
the repeated mentioning of "18 regions". Somalia "as a whole", i.e. 
including Somaliland, consists of 18 regions and the Addis agreement 
therefore clearly intends the northern independent republic to be 
ruled by the muddled setup of committees presided over by the 
southern former warlords (they are now called politicians).
     On the whole, the agreement marks the initiation of a new dark 
era for the Somalis. The factional leaders represented at the meeting 
solemnly swears to "achieve a substantial disarmament within 90 days" 
and they also reiterate their support for the previous 
disarmament/cease fire agreement from Januari (the breach of which 
nearly stopped the meeting). Stressing that "the promises made here 
are no less sacred or binding" than had they been made in the 
"serenity and shadow of a tree", the militia leaders go on to provide 
a sketch of how they are going to rule over Somalia in the future. A 
way of looking at this is, of course, that in return for cease fire 
and "substantial disarmament" (whatever that means), they are given 
the power.
     The agreement stipulates the setup of a Transitional National 
Council (TNC) to take the leading role for a period of two years. An 
Associated Press wire (March 28) erroneously says that after this 
transitional period, free and multiparty elections will be held, but 
this is actually not mentioned in the text. The TNC will consist of 
"three representatives from each of the 18 regions including one 
women (sic) from each region". Mogadishu will hold five extra seats 
and, additionally, the political factions (represented in Addis) will 
each appoint one nominee. The TNC will appoint various committees of 
which the most important one is the Traditional Charter Drafting 
Committee. The latter body will be responsible for the drawing up of 
an interrim constitution to be guided by "the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and by the Somali Traditional Ethics".
     The role of Regional Councils (RC) is more strongly emphasized 
in the final version of the agreement. RC are to be established in 
"all existing 18 regions" and they are biven a remarkable high level 
of independence. It is said that they shall be "responsible for law 
and order at the regional level". Their relation to the TNC is, 
perhaps deliberately, phrased very vaguely: it is said the they shall 
work "in coordination with the TNC". This curious arrangment would 
seem to pave the way for both regional self-rule by those factions 
who so wishes, while other factions may perceive of their power as a 
transional but yet "national" government. It would seem therefore 
that the difference from the prevailing situation will be minimal in 
terms of structural readjustments. The real difference is that the 
arrangements now will receive the blessing of the UN.
    It is embarassing that UNOSOM, who established their office in 
Mogadishu in September 1992, have still not realized that central 
negotiations with a haphazardly selected sphere of factional leaders 
does not pave the way for peace in Somalia. A more radical way to 
establish lasting peace and rebuild a civil society should have 
concentrated the efforts of the Addis Ababa agreements on disarmament 
only. With the military power of the 38 000 UNITAF troops - who 
outnumber the combined force of all the Somali militias - it would 
have been very easy to say "first you hand over weapons and then we 
will talk about the future". But UNOSOM wasted that opportunity and 
the security-council, dragging its feet, have been extremely slow 
even in producing the necessary paper work for the establishment of 
UNOSOM II.
      In the Addis Ababa meeting several speakers made frequent 
reference to need to "empower the people". In the end it seems that 
the only "people" empowered have been those that should bear the 
responsibility for the last two years of civil war.

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Posted by Bernhard Helander in Uppsala, Sweden.