🚀 go-pugleaf

RTO Trainer wrote:

> Dharmananda <Nil@neph.net> wrote in message
> news:<2654961.IJh3aZTWvU@news.verizon.net>...
>> RTO Trainer wrote:
>> 
>> > 
>> > Overwhelming Firepower is not current doctrine.
>> > 
>> > 1969 to 1974 is not current.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> OK, then what do you call the doctrine by which the attack on Fallujah
>> was fought?
> 
> Not that the doctrinal name tells you much.
> 
> MOUT.  Military Operations on Urban Terrain.


FM 90-10  -- Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army
fm/90-10/90-10ch1.htm#s_10

http://tinyurl.com/5lcq6



CHAPTER 1
Introduction

Tactical doctrine stresses that urban combat operations are conducted only
when required and that built-up areas are isolated and bypassed rather than
risking a costly, time-consuming operation in this difficult environment.
Adherence to these precepts, though valid, is becoming increasingly
difficult as urban sprawl changes the face of the battlefield. The acronym
MOUT (Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain) classifies those military
actions planned and conducted on a terrain complex where manmade
construction impacts on the tactical options available to commanders.
Commanders must treat the elements of urban sprawl as terrain and know how
this terrain affects the capabilities of their units and weapons. They must
understand the advantages and disadvantages urbanization offers and its
effects on tactical operations.

Urban combat operations may be conducted in order to capitalize on the
strategic or tactical advantages which possession or control of a
particular urban area gives or to deny these advantages to the enemy. Major
urban areas represent the power and wealth of a particular country in the
form of industrial bases, transportation complexes, economic institutions,
and political and cultural centers. The denial or capture of these centers
may yield decisive psychological advantages that frequently determine the
success or failure of the larger conflict. Villages and small towns will
often be caught up in the battle because of their proximity to major
avenues of approach or because they are astride lines of communications
that are vital to sustaining ground combat operations.

During offensive operations, commanders must seek to achieve a favorable
mobility differential over the defender, to retain momentum, and to avoid a
protracted and costly urban battle. Built-up areas are obstacles to
maneuver; hence, isolation and bypass, which neutralize their value to the
defender, are the goals of urban offensive operations.

Conversely, the defender must seek to integrate the elements of urban sprawl
into his defensive scheme to slow, block, or canalize the attacker and
enhance weapon effectiveness.

The attack or defense of a built-up area should be undertaken only when
significant tactical or strategic advantage accrues through its seizure or
control.

Urbanization is a complex, multifaceted process influenced by many factors
including a nation's cultural development, its economic resources, and its
industrial capacity. Although its form varies from region to region,
urbanization is characterized by a general pattern of changes in land usage
and the spread of manmade features across natural terrain.

Tactical terrain analysis has traditionally considered some elements of the
urban environment such as the allocation of land to agriculture or forestry
and the distribution of railway or road networks. However, the focus has
been on natural terrain elements. In Europe and other urbanized areas of
the world, increased awareness of the effects of manmade features on the
overall tactical scheme is necessary. How urban terrain elements impact on
operations is an important consideration in determining our tactical
options.

For the small-unit tactical commander, the physical layout of a buildup area
and structural characteristics of its buildings are critical planning
considerations. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of these factors
and the combat characteristics of various types of built-up areas for
offensive and defensive operations. For commanders at battalion level and
above, the size of a built-up area, the support network of lines of
communication, and the urban pattern formed by a complex of built-up areas
assume added importance. 

___________________________________________________________________

Clearly the attack on Fallujah was not required by this doctrine.  There was
something else going on here.  From what doctrine did they acquire that
idiotic idea?

"Urban combat operations may be conducted in order to capitalize on the
strategic or tactical advantages which possession or control of a
particular urban area gives or to deny these advantages to the enemy."

What were the tactical and strategic advantages that resulted from the
attack on Fallujah?  Al Zaquiri was not captured.  The insurgancy was not
abated.  Security in Iraq did not improve.  The prospect of our boys coming
home soon was effectively destroyed.  The validity, and also the liklihood 
of elections in January was degraded.  Our reputation as a civilized nation
was impunged.  




-- 
Triratanam sharanam gaccami
Dharmananda

http://mysite.verizon.net/res6zeam/american-buddhist/news.html