🚀 go-pugleaf

 
 
This is the text from a facinating documentary episode of the PBS
program FRONTLINE. It is both enlightening and infuriating. Details
on how to get the video are at the end of this file. 
 
This program talks about an electronics cartel which conspired to
and ultimately successfully took over the American flat panel
display market, as well as the uncoordinated and inept U.S.
response to this attack, both by our companies and our government.
As a result, today the USA has a 0% market share (all of it is
Japanese) in the commercial flat panel market industry. This is
more ironic considering the technology was in fact invented in the
USA by small high tech upstarts.
 
This program also talks about a number of great Japanese companies,
including Honda, and Nintendo and some of the reasons (besides
making good products) that they were able to dominate their
respective industries in the U.S. 
 
The first part of the text is slow going, but it gets very
interesting about 1/3 of the way through.
 
SCRIPT BEGINS:
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[ANNOUNCER] 
Tonight on FRONTLINE, a critical essay on the Japanese challenge to
American business.
 
[Professor CHALMERS JOHNSON, University of California, San Diego]
If you're an American business in a high-tech industry competing
with the Japanese, you are in the business of going out of
business.
 
[ANNOUNCER] 
Some critics say Japanese companies are practicing predatory
capitalism. Others argue they're only beating us at our own game.
 
[AL PACE] 
We need a Desert Storm from American industry.
 
[ANNOUNCER] 
Tonight on FRONTLINE, "Losing the War With Japan ."
 
[ROBERT KRULWICH] 
Good evening. I'm Robert Krulwich. Earlier this month President
Bush cancelled a trip to Japan and the Far East to concentrate his
attention on what's happening here at home. Ironically, one of the
purposes of that trip was to discuss trade policy with the
Japanese, a trade policy that some believe is causing many of the
problems we Americans face at home.
 
According to the people that you will meet in tonight's report,
Japan is mounting a carefully orchestrated attack on American
industry, driving many American companies out of business and
driving many Americans out of good jobs. It's an attack, say these
experts, that few Americans understand, but they warn the
ramifications for all of us are profound.
 
Later, I will be joined by three guests who offer some contrasting
points of view. But first, tonight's film is called "Losing the War
With Japan." It is produced and reported by Martin Koughan.
 
[MARTIN KOUGHAN] 
Fourth of July in the year of Desert Storm, the celebration America
had been waiting for since Vietnam. The loudest applause this day
was for the heroes of the Gulf war, the men and women who proved
what everyone knew in their hearts, that Americans and American
technology can't be beat, that America is still number one. But the
victory in the Gulf helped disguise a disturbing fact about
American power. The United States has been fighting another war, a
war it wasn't ready for, a war that it is losing.
 
[Professor CHALMERS JOHNSON, University of California, San Diego]
The Gulf war was showing off our smart bombs in order to disguise
our dumb VCR's.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Professor Chalmers Johnson from the University of California, San
Diego, studies Japanese business.
 
[Prof. JOHNSON] 
We've been fighting against Karl Marx since the late 1940's. We got
Karl Marx. He's dead. But some guys that weren't playing that game
have blind-sided both of us. You know, the Cold War is over and
Japan won.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Japan's success had made the Japanese, America's wealthiest foreign
visitors. They spend seven times more than the average tourist, but
what do they buy? This is the Capitol Boutique, a store just two
blocks from the White House. Luke Sakaguchi opened it a year ago.
The clientele is almost entirely Japanese tourists.
 
[LUKE SAKAGUCHI] 
This is a Japanese custom. Whoever go abroad, we must buy
souvenirs. Not the cheap ones, nice ones. Unfortunately, the people
have only half an hour. It's a panic. It's a war.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
The buying frenzy at the Capitol Boutique suggests one reason for
the growing tension over the trade deficit with Japan. Japanese may
visit America, but they don't buy American. 
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
I see all these are imported goods, huh? 
 
[Mr. SAKAGUCHI] 
We have also the American goods, as well. 
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
You do?
 
[Mr. SAKAGUCHI] 
But unfortunately we don't see many Americans- jeans, you make nice
jeans. We have beautiful T-shirts from America.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
To most Japanese, "Made in America" simply means "cheap."
 
[Mr. SAKAGUCHI] 
If you make a better one, we like to buy, yes. Yes. But we just
cannot find. Yes.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
If Japanese don't want to buy American, Americans are not reluctant
to buy Japanese. One out of every three cars sold in America is
Japanese and that, along with the recession, spells big trouble for
U.S. auto makers. Chrysler Corporation has already lost more than
a billion dollars this year and the trouble is likely to get much
worse.
 
[LEE IACOCCA] 
We believe in open markets. We believe in free trade.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Lee Iacocca is the chairman of Chrysler.
 
[Mr. IACOCCA] 
But the world has changed. There are a lot of guys that aren't
playing by those rules and we're getting our head handed to us.
We're getting clobbered.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
When auto makers have trouble, so do the suppliers of steel,
textiles, plastics, rubber, every basic industry in America. As the
American car industry shrinks, auto parts makers must sell to other
auto makers. The most important are the Japanese.
 
[Mr. IACOCCA] 
We build fantastic parts that we sell all over the world. The U.S.
sells $15 billion in auto parts to Germany, sophisticated
countries, France, Italy. We can't sell any in Japan. They say- 
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
Why?
 
[Mr. IACOCCA] 
Well, they claim our quality and costs aren't good enough. Well, if
they're good enough for Mercedes, why in the hell aren't they good
enough for Toyota?
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Early this year Iacocca, along with the chairmen of G.M. and Ford,
went to the White House to ask for help against what they call
"unfair Japanese competition." Roger Porter is assistant to the
President for economic and domestic policy.
 
[ROGER PORTER, White House Economic Advisor] 
The administration has no plans to assist a particular firm in any
industry, whether it's Chrysler or anyone else.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
In Washington, the guiding principle that shapes national economic
policy is the separation of business and government. At the White
House, it is close to a state religion. The administration believes
that American business can fight foreign competition alone.
 
[Mr. PORTER] 
We have a history in this country of dynamic American
entrepreneurs. It is something that I hope we never lose in this
country. America is and has been and I hope will always remain a
frontier of opportunity.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
There was a time when American cars were the envy of the world, but
today the reputation for quality and reliability in the world
market belongs to Japanese cars. The change represents the triumph
of Japan's national industrial policy which mandates that business
and government work together for national objectives. For an
American businessman facing Japanese competition, the results can
be devastating. Al Pace found out the hard way.
 
[AL PACE] 
They're working to a script we're not. We're an event and they're
a blueprint. That's the difference between the two. 
 
[INTERVIEWER] We're an event and they're a blueprint? 
 
[Mr. PACE] Certainly.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Al Pace was the president and owner of Variety Stamping, a supplier
of auto parts to General Motors for 50 years. It WAS very much a
family business. Wife Betty handled the books. Daughter Diane was
the computer operator. Son Mark supervised production. They worked
together every day until two years ago when everything fell apart.
 
[BETTY PACE] 
It's something I don't enjoy reliving. It.. it just went from bad
to worse. He had the hardest time. He had the hardest time. I mean,
I think it all hit him, he just lost a part of himself. We all did,
but more so Al because that was his.. his American Dream.
 
[Mr. PACE] 
I was born in Cleveland, educated in Cleveland, invested my money
and my energy in Cleveland, and the proudest thing I did was that
I employed Cleveland people. We had a reputation as a trouble-free
source. We were the kind of people that you went to and if we said
it would be there, it was there.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Al Pace built Variety Stamping into a $25 million company with over
200 jobs, but there was a problem. General Motors business was
starting to shrink. If Variety was to keep growing, it would have
to make parts for the only expanding market, the Japanese auto
makers who were building new plants across the Midwest.
 
Al Pace went on the offensive. He even made a video in Japanese. It
seemed to work. Honda Motor Company was under pressure to buy
American parts for its new factory in Marysville, Ohio. Variety was
offered a big contract from Honda with one catch: They would share
the project with a Japanese partner, Kikuchi.
 
[Mr. PACE] 
We were awarded the programs and we had quoted the tools, but we
weren't given the opportunity of building the tools. The statement
was that they just didn't feel that American suppliers would be
capable of delivering the tools on a timely basis. So the tooling
was awarded to Kikuchi, my partner from Japan.
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
So you bought the tools from your partner? 
 
[Mr. PACE] 
That's correct.
 
[JIM GALE] 
I truly believe that we were being set up, that there was
no intention ever to make Al their partner and that there was no
intention of having a long-term relationship with Variety.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Jim Gale supervised the Honda contract at Variety. He says the
tools supplied by Kikuchi were defective. The result: production
delays and bad parts. Gale believes Kikuchi had good reason not to
try.
 
[Mr. GALE] 
Kikuchi actually could be construed as a competitor of ours. In
Japan, they were making the same parts that we were making here.
When I found out that we were also paying them a royalty for
technical assistance, I was really stunned. Absolutely couldn't
believe it.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Kikuchi was not just any competitor, but part of Honda's corporate
family or keiretsu. Like other Japanese industrial giants, Honda is
actually a complex web of companies that hold shares in one
another. Like cartels, keiretsu set prices and control profits to
ensure the health of their members. Buying from keiretsu partner
ultimately means lower cost, since Honda gets to share in Kikuchi's
profits. 
 
[Prof. JOHNSON] 
I think that it is expected that Variety Stamping would fail under
these circumstances. That is, the kinds of incentives, the kinds of
institutional requirements that Variety Stamping faces compared
with the Japanese requirements means that they are going to rail. 
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
When the tools supplied by Kikuchi broke down, engineers were sent
from Japan to repair them. They did not speak English. Production
slowed and costs soared. 
 
[Mr. PACE] Our partner supplied us the weld systems, which did not
make acceptable welds. We had components supplied to us by Japan
that when put together, did not create an acceptable product. Mr. 
 
[KOUGHAN] 
Even when Honda inspectors approved parts at Variety, other
inspectors would often reject them when they arrived in Marysville.
In a matter of months, Variety Stamping collapsed. 
 
[Mr. GALE] 
I think that they wanted their own company producing these parts.
I think they wanted to go through the motions of saying that, "Yes,
we tried an American supplier and they could not give us the
quality that we needed." 
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
So they were building a case against Variety? 
 
[Mr. GALE] 
I believe that's exactly what they were doing. 
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
FRONTLINE repeatedly offered Honda an opportunity to respond. Honda
refused. There is growing evidence Honda's claim that its cars
produced in Ohio are American-made is not true. All of the most
expensive of value-added parts are imported from Japan. In fact,
when the Customs Department inspected a Marysville Honda engine, it
found only 1 percent of the parts were made by American suppliers.
 
[Mr. GALE] 
The more value-added parts would come from Japan. We would at that
point be the assemblers. We would take the low-end no-brainer part
of it, if you will, and do that. 
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
Just piece the parts together? 
 
[Mr. GALE] 
Piece the parts together, sell our labor. 
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
And that became an American part. 
 
[Mr. GALE] 
And that then is.. in.. yeah.., to Honda, an American part. Sure.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Auto parts are now the fastest-growing Japanese import. Critics
charge Honda and other Japanese transplants have made only token
efforts to use American suppliers. Al Pace believes Honda
deliberately misled him.. and he says this is the proof: a brand
new assembly plant for Kikuchi by Honda near Marysville. Pace was
told Variety would be a partner in this joint venture. But the only
partners were Japanese. Al Pace learned the news from a trade
magazine.
 
[Mr. PACE] 
A $60 million facility! Finding out from the back page of
Automotive News rather than your partner does lead you to suspect
that perhaps the relationship wasn't as open and above board as it
could have been.
 
[Mr. GALE] 
Al took it upon himself to try and fix everything and try and make
it right for his partner Honda.
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
Al Pace took them on their word? 
 
[Mr. GALE] Al Pace took them on their word.
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
And what happened? 
 
[Mr. GALE] 
Al Pace is out of business today.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
American auto parts makers are going out of business at a rate of
one every 16 hours. One reason, say critics, is that Japanese auto
makers practice predatory capitalism. The objective is not just to
win, but to drive your competition out of business.
 
[MICHAEL SEKORA, former Pentagon Analyst] 
We have not found one company yet, one Fortune 500 company, that
wasn't under attack in some shape or form.
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
By the Japanese? 
 
[Mr. SEKORA] 
By the Japanese.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Michael Sekora was once a senior analyst at the Pentagon. He was
the head of Project Socrates, a classified program in the Defense
Intelligence Agency. The objective of Project Socrates was to
identify and protect technologies critical to national security.
Sekora's research revealed that the Japanese practiced capitalism
with military discipline.
 
[Mr. SEKORA] 
If you look at some of the strategies, the way they're written up
by the Japanese, they don't talk about, "We're going to go over and
get a bigger market." They talk about "frontal attacks," "flanking
attacks." They talk about "total envelopment" strategies, which
means you take the customer and you totally surround them with
interlocking technologies such that whatever direction he turns,
he's got to use one of their technologies in order to satisfy his
needs.
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
Sounds like war almost. 
 
[Mr. SEKORA] 
It is war.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Project Socrates was designed to ensure that America's most
advanced weapons systems did not depend on foreign-made components,
but when the Bush administration took office, Project Socrates was
shut down. The President's advisers dismissed it as "industrial
policy," a violation of free market ideology.
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
Did anyone from the administration ask you why your program was
important?
 
[Mr. SEKORA] 
No. We had no discussions with the administration. 
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
So why was it ended without discussion?
 
[Mr. SEKORA] 
I don't know.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Advanced electronics helped win the Gulf war, everything from
navigation systems to smart bombs, but it was not just American
technology. Many of the most critical components were made in
Japan.
 
If Washington does not have an industrial policy, Findlay, Ohio,
does. In Japan, it's known as "friendly Findlay."
 
[Mayor KEITH ROMICK, Findlay, Ohio] 
Mr. Suzuki, how are you, my friend?
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Even the word "Ohio" means "good morning' in Japanese and the state
is working hard to live up to its name. Ohio and other industrial
states are actively courting Japanese investment and the Japanese
companies prefer rural towns like Findlay, predominantly white
communities without unions. GSW Manufacturing came to Findlay from
Japan two years ago. The company assembles electrical wiring for
automobiles. GSW is a subsidiary of Shinsei Harness Company, a
Toyota supplier. The factory is in a foreign trade zone set up by
the state, so parts and materials can be imported dutyfree. To
Findlay's mayor Keith Romick, the arrival of the Japanese is good
news.
 
[Mayor ROMICK] 
...and the positive attitudes you have towards the city of Findlay.
I think it's great. I think you're great salespeople for this city.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
But leaving industrial policy to the mayors of towns like Findlay
has been bad news for the American auto industry nationwide.
 
[Mr. PACE] 
The Japanese automotive industry trumpets the fact that they have
created 98,000 new jobs at transplant facilities and related
facilities in the United States. It's marvellous. The only
difficulty is, for the same period of time, the American auto
industry lost a half million jobs. So there has been no net gain in
automotive employment. There has been a 400,000 job decline in that
industry.
 
[1st UNEMPLOYED WORKER] 
My name is Larry Crosby. I worked at Dana Corporation for 28 years.
 
[2nd UNEMPLOYED WORKER] 
City Auto Stamping for three years.
 
[3rd UNEMPLOYED WORKER] 
Dura Corporation for seven years.
 
[4th UNEMPLOYED WORKER] 
Champion Spark Plug for 20 and a half years.
 
[5th UNEMPLOYED WORKER] 
Dura Corporation, eight years.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
For every auto worker who gets laid off, two auto parts workers
lose their jobs.
 
[6th UNEMPLOYED WORKER] 
For Dura for seven and a half years.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Job prospects are poor for these auto parts workers in Toledo,
Ohio. Their traditional customers, the Big Three, are cutting back
and there's little chance they'll get jobs with the Japanese
transplants. Seven Japanese auto makers built plants in the Mid-
west. They were quickly followed by their Japanese supplier. Six
years ago there were only 24 Japanese auto parts suppliers in
America. By next year there will be nearly 300. It is no accident.
The migration was encouraged by the industrial policy of the
Japanese government.
 
[Prof. JOHNSON] 
We claim to not have industrial policy, but every state in the
union has an industrial policy and it is to screw other states.
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
And what's the implications of that?
 
[Prof. JOHNSON] 
Well, it seems to me that it's- this gives the Japanese a
tremendous opportunity to play one state off against the other.
 
[Mr. IACOCCA] 
They go over and they say, "Look, I got tax money. I can give you
$200 million. Come locate because I've got to worry in my state
about jobs." Why do these individual states compete with each other
to get jobs, but the U.S. in total doesn't worry about jobs? See,
Michigan has an industrial policy. These states have an industrial
policy, but the U.S. says, "Oh, no, no. That gets in the way of our
ideology."
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
To convince Honda to locate in Ohio, the state gave Honda
incentives worth over $60 million to build its Marysville complex.
As part of the deal, Honda won't have to pay property taxes for 15
years. The Marysville plant led the boom in Honda's U.S. sales that
has permanently changed the shape of the industry. Today, in
American passenger car sales, the Big Three are G.M., Ford and
Honda.
 
[Mr. IACOCCA] 
They go into a cornfield. They don't go in there in the ghettos.
They don't want any of the problems, OK? And what do they do? They
have young people, farm boys, they bring in. They're healthy. They
don't use health care. They won't have a pension problem for 20 to
25 years because they're so young. You take those two loads, you
say, "Well, why don't you do that? Why don't you wipe out all your
plants and start over again?" Now, wait a minute. I got a workforce
in downtown Detroit, I'm putting a billion dollars in that.
Japanese would never do that. But at some point you got to weigh
what your obligations are to the- to your company, to your cities,
states, to society. Japanese come in clean and say, "No, no. We're
not going to buy your problems. We're going over here."
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Chrysler's problems are real and their implications ominous. The
company is saddled with old factories in inner cities. 'he average
age of its workers is over 40. And at a time when losses are
mounting, Chrysler owes its workers' pension fun(l over $3 billion.
 
[Mr. IACOCCA] 
If all the jobs go, the tax base erodes. Forget making a buck and
eating and sleeping well. Who's going to take care of the roads and
the environment? Who pays for all this stuff if there's nothing
left to tax? That's why any country that doesn't protect its
industrial base is crazy.
 
[1st UNEMPLOYED WORKER] 
I know, most of you have been looking for a job, right? I mean,
there's not enough jobs for everybody laid off in the city of
Toledo.
 
[2nd UNEMPLOYED WORKER] 
I have a house note, car payments, insurance. At this moment, no
health benefits. If I get sick, good-bye. That's it.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
The loss in tax revenue multiplies. Unemployed workers pay few
taxes. They require social services and the Japanese transplants
export most of their profits and taxes to Japan.
 
[1st UNEMPLOYED WORKER] 
If we need all these stereos and VCR's and cars and motorcycles and
snowmobiles and everything else that we're buying that's made in
other countries, if it was made right here we'd all be working and
we'd all be getting a dignified income.
 
[CAR SALESMAN] 
All your hatch releases are here for your back. This is for you-
for your headlight covers. Power mirror's in the door. You elect
the side, right or left. This is for your fog lights. The next
circle down behind you is the temperature control. Blue is cold,
red is hot.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Christina Schindeldecker is buying a new car. She was unhappy with
her old one, a Plymouth from Chrysler.
 
[CHRISTINA SCHINDELDECKER] 
My dad told me a lot about Japanese cars. He said that they're made
very well.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
She's decided to buy a Mitsubishi Eclipse. 
 
[SALESMAN] 
How'd you like that?
 
[Ms. SCHINDELDECKER] 
Oh, it's great! 
 
[SALESMAN] 
Isn't that a nice car?
 
[Ms. SCHINDELDECKER] 
It's very nice. Very nice.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
But sometimes the difference between Japanese and American cars is
less than consumers think. In fact, the Mitsubishi Eclipse is
identical to this car, the Plymouth Laser. They're both
manufactured in the same factory in Illinois, yet in America the
Mitsubishi Eclipse outsells the Plymouth Laser two to one. Consumer
demand for Japanese cars, built in modern factories subsidized by
state tax incentives, is accelerating the decline of the U.S. auto
industry and the jobs that depend on it.
 
[CLYDE PRESTOWITZ, former Commerce Department Official] 
The states are unfortunately engaging in self-destructive
competition.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Clyde Prestowitz is a former Commerce Department official and an
expert on Japanese business.
 
[Mr. PRESTOWITZ] 
They are being played off, one against the other, and they are in
a sense subsidizing the destruction of a large part of the U.S.
auto and auto parts industry.
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
Do the Japanese think we're fools?
 
[Mr. PRESTOWITZ] 
Yes. The short answer is yes. I can't tell you how many times
Japanese from the government, Japanese from academia, Japanese from
industry, say to me, "Prestowitz-san, don't you Americans know
what's happening to you?" And it's not just Japanese. I've had the
same comment from Koreans, from Singaporeans, from Hong Kong
Chinese, from Taiwanese, from Frenchmen, from Germans. The rest of
the world thinks we are absolutely nuts.
 
[COMMERCE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL] 
Let me underscore that this is a public informal hearing which is
not-
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
The world find U.S. trade policy a bit crazy because it gives
American business few weapons to fight the trade war with Japan.
 
[PAUL ROSENTHAL, Flat Panel Industry Attorney] 
Without fair pricing in the marketplace, the industry will not
fulfill its potential. Indeed, it may not survive its infancy. 
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
The petitioners at this Commerce Department hearing know how tough
a fight it can be. They claim Japanese "dumping," or selling below
cost, destroyed their industry. They represent the last remaining
U.S. manufacturers of flat panel display screens, which are most
commonly used in laptop computers. But the future possibilities are
vast.
 
[Mr. PRESTOWITZ] 
There are many areas into which this technology will go. It's not
just computers. We're going to have flat panel displays for our
television sets. We're going to have flat panel displays in our
automobiles. Radar screens in control towers and in aircraft are
going to be flat panel displays. Medical imaging is going to be
flat panel display. It's going to be a pervasive technology.
Dominance of that flat panel display technology is going to be a
big step towards achieving dominance in laptop computers,
television sets, radar displays, automobile displays, medical
displays and so forth.
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
So this is a critical component we're talking about. 
 
[Mr. PRESTOWITZ] 
It's a very important component.
 
[COMMERCE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL] 
This is a very difficult case in a very critical industry. 
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
The flat panel case is in its 11th month of hearings, economic
studies and legal briefs. It is a slow process.
 
[Mr. ROSENTHAL] 
On page F-3 under the listing "Property and Equipment, Net," that-
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
The business of dumping is highly technical. Few understand the
mechanics and even those who do often have trouble defining the
terms.
 
[1st WITNESS] 
See, you accept the concept of- of partial B.I.A. or- 
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Proof is often difficult to obtain and every point is subject to
endless interpretation.
 
[2nd WITNESS] 
In order to go into a yield calculation, the material has to go
through the end of the process. 
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
While the hearings and appeals drag on, the dumping and the damage
continue. The technology was invented by American companies 30
years ago, but it was Japanese companies, with the support of their
government, that spent the billions necessary to create the
industry. The Japanese now control 90 percent of the market. They
are charged with selling their screens for as little as one third
what it cost to make them, and they have spared no expense
defending against the charges.
 
[Mr. ROSENTHAL] 
We estimate that the Japanese spent more at one hearing than we
have budgeted for our entire case.
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
For the whole case?
 
 
[Mr. ROSENTHAL] 
For the entire case. I would say we're probably going to be
outspent about 100 to 1.
 
[KAREL VAN WOLFEREN] 
If there is a pool effort and this, of course, we have seen in the
camera industry. We have seen it in the home electronics industry.
We've seen it in the car industry. If there is a concerted effort
for international market share, Japanese large corporations are
virtually unbeatable.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Karel Van Wolferen is a Dutch business journalist who lives in
Japan.
 
[Mr. VAN WOLFEREN] 
Since large Japanese corporations do not go bankrupt, it means they
can always in their campaigns for market share outcompete everybody
else. They'll always win. It means that American or European
companies cannot really compete.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Jim Hurd is a classic American success story. Eight years ago, he
saw the opportunity to create a new product. He founded Planar
Systems of Beaverton, Oregon, now the nation's largest maker of
flat panel displays. Hurd wants to compete for the booming laptop
computer market, yet despite Planar's success, he can't find
investors.
 
[JIM HURD] 
If you're an entrepreneur trying to raise money for a company that
is going to take on the Japanese or compete .with the Japanese in
one of their targeted markets, you won't raise money.
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
What you're saying is that the capital markets believe that if
you're going against Japanese competition, you don't have a prayer.
 
[Mr. HURD] 
Absolutely.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Planar manufactures highly specialized screens for the Department
of Defense. To enter the consumer market, Planar would have to
invest $100 million in new facilities, but the numbers just don't
add up.
 
[PLANAR MANAGER] 
(to staff meeting) Can we sell this particular display at the
prices that we had laid out? And so-
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
At the current market price, Planar would lose money on every
screen, a disaster for an American company, but not for a Japanese
company in a target industry.
 
[Prof. JOHNSON] 
When Americans ask, "Is Hitachi making a profit on semiconductors?"
you always want to say to them, "Even if we had the information,
you've asked the wrong question." Hitachi doesn't care. They're
carrying semiconductors because it's the industry of the future.
It's an industry they know they have to be in and they're going to
be in it.
 
[Mr. HURD] 
(to staff meeting) The greatest pressure on them is format change
versus performance enhancement.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
To Jim Hurd, Japan's low price strategy has a single objective: to
ensure that no one can make a competing product and stay in
business.
 
[Mr. HURD] 
The Japanese, contrary to popular opinion, don't have any interest
in losing money, so what they want to do- the strategy is very
clear. You want to go into these markets. You want to drive
competition out. You want to come down the cost curve as fast as
possible, but as soon as the competition is gone and the users of
the displays have no choice, the price goes up.
 
[Prof. JOHNSON] 
As it stands right now, if you're an American business in a
high-tech industry competing with the Japanese, you are in the
business of going out of business.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
The Department of Commerce found the Japanese guilty of dumping
flat panel displays, but for Jim Hurd the fight is not over. He
must now go to another federal agency and prove the dumping
actually hurt his business.
 
[INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION CHAIRMAN] 
I welcome you to this hearing on behalf of the U.S. International
Trade Commision. The hearing is on investigation number 731, T.A.
469, final, involving high information content flat panel displays
and sub-assemblies thereof from Japan.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
The final chapter of the flat panel case. It has taken one year.
 
[INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION CHAIRMAN] 
The purpose of the investigation is to determine whether an
industry in the United States is materially injured or is
threatened with material injury or-
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Jim Hurd and his fellow entrepreneurs are facing new opposition,
only this time the opponents are not Japanese.
 
[PAUL LOW, Vice President, IBM] 
If you don't have the right technology, you're not going to make my
cut and if you don't have the ability to produce that in volume so
I can make some money out of it, then you won't make that cut.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
American computer companies buy their flat panels from Japan. They
claim the Americans don't make the products they need.
 
[RANDY BATTAT, Vice President, Apple Computer] 
Our experience in sourcing flat panels from the U.S. has been a
series of dead ends.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
But Jim Hurd claims companies like IBM, Apple and Compaq had a
chance to buy American.
 
[Mr. HURD] 
No company, Japanese or American, had those displays readily
available- available at all. They were all new developmental items
that had to be developed for those applications. U.S. companies
were every bit as capable of developing those products as Japanese
companies.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
The motive, says Hurd, was profit. The Japanese promised to supply
huge quantities of laptop screens to American computer companies at
half what it cost to make them.
 
[Prof. JOHNSON] 
Indeed, if you're an American consumer, it is a good buy in the
short term.
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
In the long term? 
 
[Prof. JOHNSON] 
In the long term it's probably a disaster.
 
[Mr. PRESTOWITZ] 
The same Japanese companies that make these flat panel displays
also make computers, so the U.S. computer companies have become
dependent on some of their major competitors for key components of
their own products.
 
[Mr. SEKORA] 
It can get to the point where the American company is dependent
upon the Japanese technology and therefore the Japanese can dictate
terms to the Americans on what they will and will not do.
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
They can cut off their supply. 
 
[Mr. SEKORA] 
That's right, cut off their supply. And if they- the United States,
does not have the technology, then they can't make the products.
 
[Mr. HURD] 
The companies that we once thought were great manufacturing
companies- the IBMs, Compaqs, Apples- are really very much
hollowed-out compared to what they were. They are now really
re-packagers or assemblers.
 
(at hearing) Seeking short-term profits from dumped components, the
U.S portable computer manufacturers have all ended up buying
components from the same Japanese suppliers. Look on the back of
Compaq's flagship model LTE 386. It proudly proclaims, "Assembled
in the U.S.A."
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
When Jim Hurd made his case to the International Trade Commission,
the room was filled with over 30 top Washington trade attorneys.
Nearly half once held senior positions in the U.S. government. All
were working for the Japanese.
 
[PAT CHOATE, Author, "Agents of Influence"]
 
The Japanese call it "putting an American face on Japan's
position." The Japan lobby is literally able to dominate
politically virtually any issue that it chooses to take on.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Pat Choate is an author who has written extensively about the Japan
lobby.
 
[Mr. CHOATE] 
Since 1972, one half of our trade negotiators have become foreign
agents after they left office. What we find today is that most of
these officials are literally planning on becoming foreign agents
when they go into the position. Their public position is a way for
them to develop a client list.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
To defend their position at this hearing, the Japanese hired former
officials of the U.S. trade representative's office, the Department
of Justice, the Department of Commerce and the International Trade
Commission itself, the ITC.
 
[BILL ALBERGER, Compaq Computer] 
Certainly you could look at like product and come out differently
than Commerce did.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Bill Alberger represents Compaq. His treatment at this hearing is
uncommonly polite.
 
 
[ITC OFFICIAL] 
Hope you enjoyed your lunch. 
 
[Mr. ALBERGER] 
Very pleasant, thank you.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
One reason is that Alberger is on familiar turf. He was once
chairman of the ITC.
 
[ITC OFFICIAL] 
Commissioner Alberger, with you, on the question that Commissioner
Rohr was asking-
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Japan's case against the American entrepreneurs is based entirely
on the economic analysis of this woman, Paula Stern. Her opinion
carries weight here, too. She also chaired the ITC.
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
How do you respond to critics who feel that it's inappropriate for
a former ITC chairman like yourself to lobby for foreign firms?
 
[PAULA STERN] 
I'm not lobbying. This is a quasijudicial agency of the U.S.
government. I am an expert witness, combining my economic and my
legal and my capabilities and background. In fact, there are others
here too who have appeared before me, who have been lawyers. I am
not a lawyer, but I have administered this law for nine years and
I have the economic skills and the background in analyzing
industries. This is not lobbying.
 
[Mr. CHOATE] 
If a former Japanese government official went through the revolving
door as American officials do, that official would become a social
leper in Japan. Their family would be ostracized in Japan. And
several generations from now, their greatgrandchildren would be
left to explain why their predecessors did that. It's just enormous
social pressure and it's not done.
 
[Mr. HURD] 
We are here to compete. We can only compete worldwide if the U.S.
government enforces fair trade laws. Thank you.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Jim Hurd and his fellow entrepreneurs proved Japanese dumping hurt
their business. The ITC agreed to impose stiff duties on the
Japanese flat panel industry. But the victory may prove
meaningless. To avoid the high duties, American computer makers
plan to move assembly of laptop computers off shore. The result:
fewer American jobs. The Japanese now exercise nearly total control
over the most advanced display technology, a technology that was
invented in the U.S., a technology the American computer industry
depends on.
 
 
[Mr. SEKORA] 
A technology which is the center of their ability to actually
produce the product is being pulled out right through the back door
by their adversaries and that's what they will use to attack them,
to push them out of business.
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
Does all this scare you? 
 
[Mr. SEKORA] 
It scares the hell out of me. 
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
Why?
 
[Mr. SEKORA] 
Because I see that the whole pace of this whole attack, this whole
thing, is getting faster and faster. They will continue to get more
and more control in the United States. They can call the shots on
exactly what the consumer gets, what companies are making the
products, and they will have financial control.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
If the dangers of monopoly control seem farfetched, consider the
case of video games.
 
[SALES EXECUTIVE] 
We're continuing to maintain our retail sales plan at the $4
billion level. Four and a half million units in hardware, 45
million units in software. The SNES continues to have a unit sales
projection through December of two million units with six million
units of software projected.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
The men sitting in this room control the American video game
industry. Nintendo- the most successful Japanese company in America
by at least one measure- Nintendo controls 85 percent of the U.S.
video game market.
 
[SALES EXECUTIVE] 
We can't underestimate the value of 60 million players.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
And Toys "R" Us, the world's largest toy retailer. They're meeting
to plan for the all-important Christmas season at the annual
consumer electronics show in Chicago, the most important trade show
in the industry. Even in a business known for flash and glitz, the
Nintendo exhibit is something special, a $6 million display of pure
market power.
 
[PROMOTIONAL VIDEO] 
A Nintendo entertainment system is the frosting on the cake!
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
To marketing vice president Peter Main, selling Nintendo is easy. 
 
 
[PETER MAIN] 
They come, they try, they like and they buy. And it's a fun
business. 
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Especially fun if there's no competition. Companies that try to
compete with Nintendo have an uphill fight. 
 
[DAN VAN ELDEREN] 
(demonstrating game) When you're the batter, these control moving
yourself forward and backward. 
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Dan Van Elderen is the president of Tengen, one of Nintendo's few
competitors. Tengen can't get major retailers like Toys "R" Us to
even carry its products. Van Elderen says Nintendo is the reason.
 
[Mr. VAN ELDEREN] 
In a matter of three or four months, they were able to one by one
contact all major retailers and convince them or intimidate them or
induce them not to handle Tengen product.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Richard Frick is also trying to take on Nintendo. These factory
workers in San Jose, California, are manufacturing video games for
his company, American Video Entertainment.
 
[RICHARD FRICK] 
We can't match them dollar for dollar, but we can match them game
for game.
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
How many of the top 20 retail toy stores are your products in right
now?
 
[Mr. FRICK] 
None of the top 20 retail toy stores. None at all.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Richard Frick says you can't buy his games in stores because
retailers fear retaliation from Nintendo.
 
[Mr. FRICK] 
The fear they have of not receiving future products into their
stores, which they very much count on for their profits.
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
Fear that Nintendo will cut them off?
 
[Mr. FRICK] 
Would cut them off or not ship them or undership them the products
that they need, the new hit products.
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
What's the response you get from Toys "R" Us?
 
[Mr. FRICK] 
Well, they try to be very careful about what they say. They don't
want to do anything to get themselves in trouble. And more than
anything else, they just say that we're not a vendor that they can
deal with at this point in time.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Toys "R" Us refused FRONTLINE's request for an interview. It's no
surprise Toys "R" Us tries not to offend Nintendo. Competitors
claim Nintendo games represent 15 percent of Toys "R" Us revenues,
but 25 percent of its profits.
 
[CUSTOMER] 
The tape's kind of expensive, but you know, kids want it so you've
got to get it for them.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Parents may wonder why there's almost never a Nintendo sale. 
 
[Mr. FRICK] 
In six years, the price hasn't gone down at all, not at all. Not at
all. 
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
But every consumer product I can think of-, VCR's, CD's- the price
always goes down. 
 
[Mr. FRICK] 
Oh, I believe that the manufacturing cost of these products have
gone down significantly for Nintendo. They've just kept all that
money instead of passing it on to the consumer. There's no reason
for them to. There's no competition for them.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Richard Frick says he can sell his games for less than $20 and
still make a big profit. The Federal Trade Commission recently
discovered how Nintendo keeps its prices high.
 
[KEVIN ARQUIT, Federal Trade Commission] 
Nintendo fixed prices with their dealers, wouldn't allow dealers to
discount, and as a result, consumers that tried to comparison shop
were just wasting their time.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
The FTC found Nintendo guilty of price fixing. As part of the
settlement, the company agreed to refund up to $25 million to
consumers. It will pay the fine by offering $ discounts for the
purchase of future Nintendo products.
 
[ANNOUNCER] 
(Nintendo Commercial) Introducing the next generation from
Nintendo. It's a bit more exciting, a bit more challenging, a bit
more graphic, a bit more colorful, a bit more realistic, a bit more
levels, a bit more secrets, a bit more enemies, a bit more friends-
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
And a lot more expensive. The new, improved Nintendo system was
introduced to the press this summer. It costs twice as much as the
old Nintendo.
 
[ANNOUNCER] 
(Nintendo Commercial) Nintendo. Now you're playing with power,
superpower.
 
[REPORTER] 
(at press conference) Do you see that price coming down in the
future, where these games will not be that expensive?
 
[Mr. MAIN] 
I'm not certain. There may be some prices below that. There well
could be prices above that.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Nintendo of America denied FRONTLINE's request to interview its
president, Minoru Arakawa.
 
[HOWARD LINCOLN] 
I think his English is fine, but I think he's a little bit shy and
I think he would rather have some of his other people conduct the
interviews.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Howard Lincoln is senior vice president.
 
[Mr. LINCOLN] 
We decided if we could make a video game system with quality games
that we would be successful. We took that gamble and now I think
it's appropriate for us to reap the rewards of that gamble. That is
capitalism.
 
[Mr. FRICK] 
Everything that's on the shelf is made by Nintendo. There's
absolutely no competition to make the prices cheaper and that is
one of the reasons why Nintendo's afraid of us, is we have an
alternative source of product that's completely legal, that plays
well. And they don't want to have any competition at all. That's
what a monopoly is all about.
 
[Mr. LINCOLN] 
Nintendo doesn't have anything to do with the choice that retailers
make as to what products they're going to carry and there is
absolutely no evidence that I'm aware of that Nintendo has kept any
of these other companies out of the marketplace.
 
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
While Nintendo insists they have done nothing wrong, FRONTLINE has
learned of several active federal and state investigation examining
evidence that Nintendo has monopolized the video game industry.
 
[Mr. FRICK] 
The message that's being sent is that if you want to play in the
Nintendo world, you need to play by Nintendo's rules. And if you
don't want to play by Nintendo's rules, it's going to be a very,
very hard struggle.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Nintendo has captured the imagination of America's children, but
critics claim its near total control of the market gives it the
power to decide what products reach consumers and at what price.
 
[Mr. FRICK] 
It's a matter of the American public having a choice as to what
they can and can't do. Suppose Sony decided to take and make all of
the Columbia Picture movies compatible only with Sony videotape
players. There would be a situation very similar to what Nintendo's
trying to do with us
 
[Mr. VAN ELDEREN] 
When you start applying that to movies or books, magazines or TV
shows, I think it's very clear how that can be really significant.
 
[Prof. JOHNSON] 
It begins to affect what's seen, what's done, what's shown. And we
know who's boss. That is to say, if you don't think ownership
matters, you're not playing capitalism any longer. And the Japanese
would be the owners of these companies.
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
But you seem to be suggesting that somehow this Japanese ownership
could abridge free speech in this country.
 
[Prof. JOHNSON] 
Oh, I think no question about it. No question about it. I mean,
that is to say, money does talk.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Control of the video game market has given Nintendo the opportunity
for immense profit. Its cash reserves alone exceed a billion and a
half dollars. But money is not the only measure.
 
[Prof. JOHNSON] 
The reason to be in high-tech industries these days is not to make
a profit. The reason to be in high-tech industries is those are
good jobs for your people.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
At Nintendo of America headquarters in Redmond, Washington, most
jobs aren't exactly high-tech. There are no manufacturing jobs. All
Nintendo games are made in Japan. The only work here involves
loading and unloading trucks.
 
[Mr. PRESTOWITZ] 
A nation that doesn't make anything is a nation that has a pretty
poor spirit. The United States is increasingly a nation that
doesn't make things. And if we are going to pass on to our children
the heritage that we received, if we're going to pass on something
that's rich and full and growing, the opportunities, the ability to
be the nation that we have been for most of our history, we're
going to have to produce something.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Nintendo of America doesn't produce games, but it does have a
research and development group. This is an R&D team at work, only
they don't really develop games. They play them. Most of the R&D is
done in Japan.
 
[1st GAME COUNSELOR] 
Nintendo game play. This is Sean. How can I help you?
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
The largest number of workers are game counselors. They log 150,000
calls a week.
 
[2nd GAME COUNSELOR] 
Continue to the right until you get to this real big drop-off.
That's when you want to use the umbrella.
 
[3rd GAME COUNSELOR] 
Looks like a- sort of like a balloon with a plus sign on it.
 
[4th GAME COUNSELOR] 
You want to try to shoot for the head. 
 
[5th GAME COUNSELOR] 
Well, then you have to go and fight Astos. 
 
[1st GAME COUNSELOR] 
If you go down to the bottom righthand corner, you can walk through
the wall. You want to freeze him by hitting him in the head. 
 
[CALLER] Oh, OK. 
 
[1st GAME COUNSELOR] 
Ok? But then you want to spear him kind of midway through his body.
 
[CALLER] 
All right. 
 
[1st GAME COUNSELOR] 
So it kind of cuts him in half, basically. 
 
[CALLER] 
All right. 
 
[1st GAME COUNSELOR] 
Ok? 
 
[CALLER] 
All right. That's cool. 
 
[1st GAME COUNSELOR] 
Is there anything else I can help you with? 
 
[CALLER] 
No, that'll be all. Thanks a lot. 
 
[1st GAME COUNSELOR] 
Did you get all that then? 
 
[CALLER] 
Yeah. 
 
[1st GAME COUNSELOR] 
OK. 
 
[CALLER] 
All right. Bye. 
 
[1st GAME COUNSELOR] 
Thanks for calling. 
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] (shift to scene of a U.S. elementary classroom)
These inner city students in Washington, D.C., are learning about
Japan. The program, funded partly by a Japanese foundation, is one
of thousands of such grass roots educational efforts paid for by
the Japanese government and Japanese corporations. The objective is
to help shape how young Americans view Japan. 
 
[JAPANESE TEACHER] 
They have a factory in the U.S.A. and many Americans work for that
factory, so they are very happy. 
 
[Mr. CHOATE] The Japanese are investing, at this point, tens of
millions of dollars in elementary, secondary and higher education
to make sure that the next generation of Americans think the way
about Japan that the Japanese want them to think about Japan. 
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Japanese philanthropy is seen by most as a gesture of good will,
but some see it as part of a deliberate campaign to blunt criticism
of Japan. 
 
[Mr. CHOATE] We cannot have an honest discussion about U.S.Japan
relations or our own future because too many people that are
participating in the debate are either afraid to be candid or they
have a money interest in advocating the Japanese point of view, or
at least not offending them. 
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] Pat Choate is one of those critics labeled a
"Japanbasher." Clyde Prestowitz is another. He and his family have
lived and worked in Japan. 
 
[Mr. PRESTOWITZ] 
The term "Japan-basher" is an all-purpose smear word which is used
as a McCarthyist tactic to cut off debate and I detest the word and
I detest its usage.
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
What do they accomplish by using that label? What's the purpose
behind it?
 
[Mr. PRESTOWITZ] 
It cuts off debate. If you can pin the term "Japan-basher" on
someone, then you have painted him as illegitimate. It means that
no one should listen to this person. You don't have to respond to
his arguments because obviously he's illintentioned.
 
[TEACHER] 
So what we're going to do now is to dress some of you in one of
these Yukata here.
 
[Mr. CHOATE] 
Today we're seeing the largest unilateral transfer of wealth that
the world has ever experienced, from the United States to Japan.
 
[INTERVIEWER] 
What's the significance of that?
 
[Mr. CHOATE] 
It means that we're going to be a much poorer nation. It means that
in the late 1990's and the first part of the 21st century, we're
going to have fewer choices. It means a declining standard of
living for our children, if not for ourselves.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
While critics worry the U.S. is losing the trade war with Japan,
the White House remains confident of America's strategy.
 
[Mr. PORTER] 
If you believe that Americans have the kind of ingenuity and
know-how that will allow us to compete with anyone around the
world, then you're not fearful of competition and you are convinced
that the American worker and American management and American
companies can compete with literally anyone in the world and that
we are going to do it.
 
[TEACHER] 
Keep your eyes down. Sayonara. 
 
[STUDENTS] Sayonara.
 
[TEACHER] 
One more time, Sayonara. 
 
[STUDENTS] Sayonara.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
Fourth of July in the year of Desert Storm. Celebrations of
American supremacy make the economic challenge seem far away. If
critics of U.S. trade policy are right, America is in for some very
hard times. "Free enterprise" means something different in Japan.
Al Pace learned that the openness and individualism that are the
strengths of American free enterprise can become weaknesses.
 
[Mr. PACE] 
No Japanese business is an individual. It's a team. When you talk
to a Japanese businessman, you might as well be talking to their
government, to their finance ministers in banking, to their trade
representatives, to their industry representatives. You're dealing
with a plan, a blueprint.
 
[Mr. KOUGHAN] 
The war for global markets is about more than just jobs. It's about
the kind of choices and opportunities there will be for America's
children. America won the war in the Gulf. The question is, will
America win the economic war that will shape its future?
 
[Mr. PACE] 
The American public, the American government is capable of enormous
response. Desert Storm was an example of that. We need a Desert
Storm from American industry.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------
THE END
 
PBS Frontline: Losing the War with Japan
WGBH Boston
 
To order the Video:
1-800-328-PBS1
 
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If what you read disturbed you, please tell your friends, or put
this article
in places where people will read it.
 
Also of interest are the following files at FTP site
monu6.cc.monash.edu.au:
in directory: pub/nihongo
 
japanyes:   An interesting overview of how Japanese industry
            practices 'business is war' tactics to destroy U.S.
            industries as well as some pretty facinating background
            about Japan.
 
japanno:    An unauthorized translation of a best selling book in
            Japan "A Japan that can say no (to America)!" about why
            Japan is now number one and should take the place of
            the US as world leader. By Shintaro Ishihara (Japanese
            Parliament Member "Americans are lazy, ignorant and
            stupid") and Akio Morita (SONY CEO).
 
matsushita.pbs:   A PBS Frontline special about how a Japanese
                  cartel wiped out the US TV industry and went on
                  to take over the rest of consumer electronics
 
 
Other reading of Interest (not at monu6.cc.monash.edu.au)
 
Agentlist:  The list of 'foreign agents': former U.S. government
            public officials who later used their inside government
            contacts to work as agents for foreign interests in
            order to make quick money. This list can be found in
            a book by Pat Choate called "Agents of Influence" 
            (1991 ed). It is a mainstream book and any good public
            or university library should have it. The list is
            several hundred people long and most made over a
            million dollars doing this. The positions held are very
            very high level.