🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Aug4.000830.17644@fid.morgan.com> sethb@fid.morgan.com (Seth Breidbart) writes:
>   >[The Israelis] have also spied extensively on us (the Pollard case is just
>   >what has been discovered and revealed).
>
>   How do you know about stuff that hasn't been discovered or revealed?
>   If you know about it and haven't informed the US government, you're
>   guilty of spying.  If you don't know about it, you're just a common
>   liar, like certain other anti-semites I could mention.

I seem to have touched a nerve here.  It is not a lie that the Pollard
case _by itself_ constitutes significant Israeli spying in the US.
And how can you claim (which you did implicitly by calling me a liar)
that there is and has been no other Israeli spying in the US?  That
assumption seems pretty naive.

>   >  They have been accused of
>   >selling US military technology to China and South Africa.
>
>   And when the accusations were examined, it turned out that Israel did
>   no such thing, but Saudi Arabia was selling US military technology to
>   China.  Why haven't you ever objected to that?

I do object to that.  I also object to other Arab countries using US
technology to further their own goals of developing weapons of mass
destruction.  (Witness the recent Simon Wiesenthal report on the subject.)

>   >  During the Gulf
>   >war, Israel stayed out as the result of about 3 minutes of reflection
>   >on the cost and benefits of bombing Iraq.
>
>   Tell us more about the "costs and benefits".  History shows that
>   Israel has gained by bombing Iraq (e.g. preventing Iraq from
>   developing atomic weaponry).  It was US pressure that kept Israel out;
>   Is that the "cost and benefits" you refer to?

Do I have to do your thinking for you?
Cost =
1.  Risk of loss of pilots and/or planes to the Iraqi military, to
"mistaken" attack on the part of a Coalition force member, or to
accident (the last is probably the largest risk).
2.  Risk of degrading the military efforts of the Coalition against
Iraq (major, considering the public posturing by some of the Arab
partners).
3.  Risk of provoking even more malicious attacks against Israel (e.g.
gas).
3.  Risk of public and foreign malefactors' opinion of Israel in the
event of any visible failure to achieve any significant success.
4.  Risk of losing US public opinion, and thus of future political
support, in a time when such support is waning already.
5.  Risk of not gaining access to Patriot missiles.

Benefits =

1.  Eventual (though probably not immediate, and perhaps never
significant) reduction in Scud attack rates.
2.  Adherence to the porcupine principle (touch me and you get hurt)
may reduce attacks in future conflicts (assuming rational opponents).

The balance sheet seems clear.
--
=Jim  eggertj@atc.ll.mit.edu (Jim Eggert)