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Article #110

Re: Effects of Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.

#110
From: Julie Turner
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 1997 00:00
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Arun Chandra wrote:
> 
> I am writing an article on the legal effects of Rite-Hite and King
> Instruments.  As a practical matter, I believe that this case's holding
> will encourage big corporation (with multiple patents in a given field)
> to sit on their patented inventions, while continuing to make and sell
> Products in public domain.  This might be because any infringement of
> their patented invention will lead to lost profits on all of their
> competing products, while competition for the public domain product will
> be tougher for competitors to overcome (since the Patent Holder will have
> established its presence and name-recognition in the given market).  And,
> this is effectively a monopoly, not beneficial to the general public.
> 
> Any other thoughts???  Please send me email at a_bajaj@easyway.net
> 

I think you may be onto something with this take on Rite-Hite.  It seems
to me that the patent community is very mixed as to whether Rite-Hite is
a "good" or "bad" decision.  By introducing elements of tort law into
what has essentially been a property and statutorily based patent law,
Rite-Hite has simultaneously expanded and reduced the recovery available
for patent infringement.

Keep in mind that Rite-Hite can only have the effect that you are
suggesting when there are no other non-infringing alternatives in the
market place.  

I'm curious as to why you believe that the existence of a patent on one
product in a line of products will make it harder for competitors to
"overcome" competition on the unpatented product.  Doesn't much of this
belief center on the expansiveness of the patent, whether the patentee
is the large or small player in the market, what kind of market share
competitors already have for the niche held by the unpatented product,
etc., etc.  Exactly what scenario are you envisioning?  (I recall that
Rite-Hite and Kelley had been major competitors for years in an
essentially two-player market, which is what would be required for the
Rite-Hite lack of infringing alternatives portion of the holding to
increase damages.)

I'd be most interested in hearing more about your paper and your
thoughts.

Julie Turner
Boalt Hall School of Law, 3L

	***Posting of this writing does not constitute its dedication 
	     to the public domain and does not grants a license 
		to fix this writing in any media for 
		   archival or other purposes.***
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From: Julie Turner <kazuo@uclink4.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: Effects of Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.
Date: 1997/01/27
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