🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1046@hoptoad.uucp> gnu@hoptoad.uucp (John Gilmore) writes:
>This is certainly a useful technique in cryptography.  Someone wrote
>a paper on how to break DES that involved writing many megabytes of stuff
>on magtape so you could get it back quickly later when breaking an
>encrypted message.  Things would be a lot more tractable if the table
>was in RAM instead.
>
>Even a medium sized company or country could probably buy enough RAM
>to decrypt DES quickly.

   While I'm not a big fan of DES, I don't think this is very accurate.
Unless there is some radically new method that no one outside NSA knows
about (I'm not ruling this out; it just seems that there is no sensible
way to discuss it), there is no way that a single-processor machine is
going to break DES in a reasonable period of time.  And that is what
this discussion is about, large single-processor (or perhaps a few
processors, but not hundreds or thousands) machines with large amounts
of memory.

   -- David desJardins