🚀 go-pugleaf

In <20011103181710.3e34b11d.Stefaan.Eeckels@ecc.lu>, Stefaan A Eeckels
wrote:

> How can a judgement against Microsoft, and a subsequent settlement
> between the US government and Microsoft impose obligations on
> Microsoft's competitors?

Stefann I don't understand exactly how Section III. I(5) would work. But I
also know Professor Eben Moglen is no fool.

It appears to be a poisoned provision where if you try to license
interoperability information from Microsoft it opens you up to granting
them a license to _your_ intellectual property on reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms. Those terms may be different from the terms of
the GPL and form part of the license agreement. And perhaps that agreement
would apply to a cross-license of any present or future intellectual
property created by the ISV, IHV, IAP, ICP, or OEM. If this license
agreement was upheld Microsoft might get special access to intellectual
property that other people have to implement on GPLed terms.

Plus remember that this kind of action would have been agreed to by the
Department of Justice so I imagine Microsoft would be free from DoJ
prosecution in acting in ways consistent with the settlement. This is just
speculation (and should be labelled as such): Is it not conceivable that
Microsoft may be able to do things in the next five to seven years that
might be an antitrust violation if a competitor attempted to do it
(because those competitors don't have a settlement agreement with the
DoJ)?

If you just asked a rhetorical question as to how a Microsoft prosecution
could turn into a weapon to be used against competitors then yes I'm
surprised as you are (based upon the assumption that Professor Eben
Moglen's interpretation is accurate).

Regards,
Adam