🚀 go-pugleaf

On 30 Jun 2000 12:18:05 GMT, David Mohring 
                <heretic@localhost.localdomain> wrote:
>On Fri, 30 Jun 2000 23:57:26 +1200, Slow 
>             <aputto@htomail.com.no.spam> wrote:
>>"Adam Warner" <Adam.Warner@xtra.co.nz> wrote in message
>>news:8jhds5$q2b$1@news.ihug.co.nz...
>>> Microsoft-signed files are trusted by default. This and the ability to
>>> automatically download the files to a users hard disk at any location
>>allows
>>> any unprotected files (read: virtually all) to be overwritten.
>>
>>IE objects made by Microsoft are trusted by IE (this actually makes sense).
>>All other object downloads (including Microsoft's) will display the
>>'certificate' window.
>>
>
>So it is OK for Microsoft to have unrestricted access to your network via
>any downloaded executable or script signed as "Trusted by IE" without 
>notifying the user?
>
>IMHO the problem is that, even if you trust Microsoft implicitly, it looks as 
>if the digital signature system may have been compromised. This could be the 
>reason for the rushed release of the patch.
>
Opps MS just have added to the FAQ 
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/fq00-042.asp

QUOTE 
>I don?t see a problem. So the malicious web site user
>could download an unmodified Microsoft product onto a
>visitor?s machine. Why is that a security vulnerability? 
>
>That?s where the second flaw comes in. The Active Setup
>Control also allows the caller (in this case, the malicious 
>web site operator) to specify the path and file name to which
>the file should be downloaded. This would allow the
>malicious user to overwrite any desired file on the visitor?s machine. 
>		     
>But if the malicious user couldn?t initiate the installation
>process, why would it matter if he could put the file
>wherever he wants? 
>					  
>The point of the attack would not necessarily be to try to install the 
>update - it would be simply to overwrite some file on the user?s disk. For
>instance, if the malicious web site operator overwrote a crucial file on the 
>disk, he could potentially render the machine inoperable. The fact that he 
>would be overwriting it with an Active Setup file would be incidental 
>- the important point would be his ability to overwrite the file at all. 
UNQUOTE

That is a very simple "compromise" . Why didn't Microsoft include the
destination filename in the Digital Certificate !!! 

David Mohring - Mr Gates & Co , Please read that last sentence