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the soul of a
person in the abstract and whatever qualities might be therein. We never,
then, love a person, but only qualities.

Let us, then, jeer no more at those who are honoured on account of rank and
office; for we love a person only on account of borrowed qualities.

324. The people have very sound opinions, for example:

1. In having preferred diversion and hunting to poetry. The half-learned
laugh at it, and glory in being above the folly of the world; but the people
are right for a reason which these do not fathom.

2. In having distinguished men by external marks, as birth or wealth. The
world again exults in showing how unreasonable this is; but it is very
reasonable. Savages laugh at an infant king.

3. In being offended at a blow, or in desiring glory so much. But it is very
desirable on account of the other essential goods which are joined to it;
and a man who has received a blow, without resenting it, is overwhelmed with
taunts and indignities.

4. In working for the uncertain; in sailing on the sea; in walking over a
plank.

325. Montaigne is wrong. Custom should be followed only because it is
custom, and not because it is reasonable or just. But people follow it for
this sole reason, that they think it just. Otherwise they would follow it no
longer, although it were the custom; for they will only submit to reason or
justice. Custom without this would pass for tyranny; but the sovereignty of
reason and justice is no more tyrannical than that of desire. They are
principles natural to man.

It would, therefore, be right to obey laws and customs, because they are
laws; but we should know that there is neither truth nor justice to
introduce into them, that we know nothing of these, and so must follow what
is accepted. By this means we would never depart from them. But people
cannot accept this doctrine; and, as they believe that truth can be found,
and that it exists in law and custom, they believe them and take their
antiquity as a proof of their