🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Nov9.005957.7189@midway.uchicago.edu>,
gal2@ellis.uchicago.edu (Jacob Galley) wrote:
> 
> 
> Can anyone direct me toward any viable theories of meaning that do not
> postulate that some kind of truth functional logic is at the
> foundation of meaning?
> 

Several philosophers of science and AI researchers (among others)have taken
the stance  
you are asking for. The difference between this view and a
mathematical-logical one
lies basically in the perspective on semantics which is taken - a
perspective leaning 
towards syntax, or towards pragmatics, respectively. If you by your
question indicate
an interest in the latter perspective, you may want to take a look at Paul
Thagaard's book 
"A computational Philosophy of Science" (MIT Press, 1987), and into some AI
papers 
arguing against the syntactic-semantic view. Prominent exemplars of general
treatments 
are Drew McDermott's paper "A critique of pure reason", in Computational 
Intelligence 3 (1987) 151-160, and Larry Birnbaum's "Rigor mortis: a
response to 
Nilsson's 'Logic and artificial intelligence'", in AI Journal 47(1991)
57-77. 

Agnar Aamodt
Dep. of Informatics
University of Trondheim, Norway
(agnar@ifi.unit.no)