Re: AI need not take stance on non-functional aspects of qualia

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#241

From: Christopher Green
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 14:41

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In article <1992Nov11.073728.17827@nevada.edu> snit@nevada.edu (S. Nev. Institute of Tech.) writes:
>
>Does anyone have a good arguement that qualia can not be defined soley
>on a functional basis?  If so, is this qualia outside a formal system?
>Outside the realm of AI?  Any refutation of these arguements?
>
Read Frank Jackson's "Epiphenomenal qualia". In fact, you'll probably want to
look at all the papers on consciousness and qualia reprinted in Lycan's
_Mind and Cognition_ (1990, Blackwell).

-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1

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Newsgroups: sci.cognitive
Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!utcsri!psych.toronto.edu!christo
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: AI need not take stance on non-functional aspects of qualia
Message-ID: <1992Nov11.144132.6768@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1992Nov11.073728.17827@nevada.edu>
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 14:41:32 GMT
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