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Article #255Re: AI need not take stance on non-functional aspects of qualia
From: dodsonsl
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 15:06
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 15:06
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1399 bytes
In article <1992Nov11.144132.6768@psych.toronto.edu>, christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes: > In article <1992Nov11.073728.17827@nevada.edu> snit@nevada.edu (S. Nev. Institute of Tech.) writes: >> >>Does anyone have a good arguement that qualia can not be defined soley >>on a functional basis? If so, is this qualia outside a formal system? >>Outside the realm of AI? Any refutation of these arguements? >> > Read Frank Jackson's "Epiphenomenal qualia". In fact, you'll probably want to > look at all the papers on consciousness and qualia reprinted in Lycan's > _Mind and Cognition_ (1990, Blackwell). > Jackson's paper is a good one. One that is very critical of functionalism is Ned Block's "Trouble with Functionalism", another you may want to check out is Churchland's "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes". Both of these are reprinted in a volume titled 'The Nature of Mind', edited by David M. Rosenthal.
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Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!gatech!nntp.msstate.edu!memstvx1!dodsonsl From: dodsonsl@memstvx1.memst.edu Newsgroups: sci.cognitive Subject: Re: AI need not take stance on non-functional aspects of qualia Message-ID: <1992Nov13.090633.4063@memstvx1.memst.edu> Date: 13 Nov 92 09:06:33 -0600 References: <1992Nov11.073728.17827@nevada.edu> <1992Nov11.144132.6768@psych.toronto.edu> Organization: Memphis State University Lines: 16