🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <28179@castle.ed.ac.uk> 
cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:

>In article <1992Nov13.100925.2924@news.Hawaii.Edu> 
>lee@Hawaii.Edu (Greg Lee) writes:

GL:
>>Paraphrases are expressions that mean the
>>same thing, so there must be a thing that they mean, and once we've
>>found it, we'll know why they are paraphrases.

CM:
>Reification rides again! Why must there be such a thing? Why could not
>paraphrases be identifiable simply by a certain kind of transformation
>capable of turning one into another?

This is a bogus objection, Chris.  Once your theory identifies the said
transformations, it is a short step indeed to characterize restricted
versions thereof, which will be bijections in extension.  Then you will
want to talk about equivalence classes under the induced relation,
thereby committing yourself to abstract propositions and concepts.

In general, reification is unavoidable under any reasonable view of
ontological commitment.  Even that classic would-be example of gratuitous
reification of "sakes" from the use of locutions like "for the sake of
X", or "for its own sake" is perfectly reasonable, nay, unavoidable, in
any systematic discussion of teleological theory of value.

>-- 
>Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
>Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
>5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Un de mes plus grands plaisirs est de jurer Dieu quand je bande."