🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Nov18.035416.23721@news2.cis.umn.edu>, frank@i1.msi.umn.edu (Loren Frank) writes:

> 	On a slightly related topic, when people are given the following
> scenario :Linda has been very active in social concerns for most
> of her life. During college she was involved in a number of organizations
> whose aim was to bolster the rights of the underrepresented. 
> People are then asked "which of the following is more likely:
> 1) Linda is a bank teller.
> 2) Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement."
> People almost always choose 2) even though the likelyhood of a conjunction
> is always less than the likelyhood of one of the conjuncts.
> 
> I am not quite sure what that means, but it is true...

Several people have posted possible explanations for this phenomenon (the
conjunction effect).  The findings Loren refers to are from a paper by
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman titled "Judgements of and by
representativeness", which appears in their book with Paul Slovic,
_Judgement under uncertainty_.  The authors offer another explanation
in the book, if folks are interested in following up on this.

If anyone knows of a computational model of Kahneman & Tversky's availability,
representativeness, and simulation heuristics, I'd like to hear about it.

	-dp-