🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <erwin.722217539@trwacs> 
erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com (Harry Erwin) writes:

>Unfortunately, the brain doesn't operate that way. Two statements are
>considered equivalent if their processing generates the same activation in
>the cerebral cortex (or a subset thereof). Since cortical activation is an
>analog process, distributed over multiple layers, and reflecting nonlinear
>dynamics at all scales, from the synaptic switching in the dendritic arbor
>on up, defining equivalence becomes somewhat problematical.

I discern several brazen counterfactual assumptions:
(i)	that mind states supervene on brain states;
(ii)	that understanding is a function of brain-state tokens;
(iii)	that physicalism allows a reduction of semantic primitives.
 
That "two statements are considered equivalent if their processing
generates the same activation in the cerebral cortex (or a subset
thereof)" is a social fact about your discipline, that says absolutely
nothing about the kind of equivalence involved.  In fact, identity or
similarity of activation patterns is a syntactic criterion by any
reasonable definition of syntax; likewise for the frivolous attribution
of synonymy as determined by similarity or identity of activations of
the frontal cortex.  Concerning your appeal elsewhere to the bizarre
notion of semantic grounding, as I told you in email, my inability to
conceive of any coherent theory thereof prevents me from imagining any
way to demonstrate it in primitive mammals, in the same way I would
believe you unable to demonstrate the holy nature of a self-professed
Himalayan yogi via lab measurements.

Physicalism depends on reducing semantics to physical primitives, or on
eliminating it altogether.  The former is logically impossible, as there
is no way to partition the causal structure of the physical universe, so
as to obtain the requisite "intentional stance".  In other words, there
is no coherent way to systematically differentiate the physicalist
universe into subject and object, as required for the representational
model which by definition underlies all extant conceptions of semantics.
"Grounding" is just a special case of this situation.  Reductionism is
the sole viable physicalist alternative; at this time I have no interest
in discussing its alleged merits.  Until you learn how to address this
point, instead of repeating _ad nauseam_ the same received ideas, I see
absolutely no reason to continue this exchange.  End of this discourse.

>Cheers,
>
>-- 
>Harry Erwin
>Internet: erwin@trwacs.fp.trw.com
>

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes."