Article View: sci.cognitive
Article #362Re: John Searle
From: Michael Gemar
Date: Tue, 22 Dec 1992 17:29
Date: Tue, 22 Dec 1992 17:29
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In article <1992Dec21.002907.10911@cs.su.oz.au> danny@cs.su.oz.au (Danny) writes: >In article <1992Dec18.003427.2149@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes: >>*No* popular account of consciousness (assuming dualism isn't popular) >>gives a causal role to it. Functionalism certainly doesn't - there is >>no reason to ascribe "consciousness" to certain functional arrangements >>except for sake of discursive simplicity (i.e., "intentional stance"). >>*Nobody* who's a materialist has a clue how consciousness could have >>causal efficacy. (This may be all the worse for materialism, but >>that's another story...) > >Well if it has no causal consequences why on earth would we want to believe >there is such a thing? > Well, *I* feel pain, see colours, hear sounds, etc. I guess you're simply anesthetized... - michael
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Newsgroups: sci.cognitive Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!utcsri!psych.toronto.edu!michael From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) Subject: Re: John Searle Message-ID: <1992Dec22.172901.27737@psych.toronto.edu> Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto References: <1992Dec17.015705.630@cs.su.oz.au> <1992Dec18.003427.2149@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Dec21.002907.10911@cs.su.oz.au> Date: Tue, 22 Dec 1992 17:29:01 GMT Lines: 20