🚀 go-pugleaf

michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>In article <766@capmkt.COM> charles@capmkt.COM (Charles Neveu) writes:
>>michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>>Then how can one claim that the Chinese Room, based upon an objective
>>description and analysis of its structure (the basis of Searle's
>>argument), doesn't not really understand Chinese but only simulates
>>understanding of Chinese, which to Searle are two very different
>>things? 
>In brief, because the Chinese Room, like all computers, merely manipulates
>"marks" (using the term "symbol" carries incorrect connotations) in a
>purely syntactic manner.  This won't get you semantics, which is the
>basis of understanding.  

This brings me back to my original question: How do you know when you
"get semantics" and when you don't, solely by looking at the structure
of the organism? How about an equally contrived counter-example of a
non-brain type thing that does understand Chinese, because it "has
semantics"? 

>I'd suggest that you read _Minds, Brains, and Science_ by Searle if you
>want a short, simple introduction to Searle's view of the mind.
Ok. 
>Alternatively, you could read the original "Minds, Brains, and Programs"
>in the 1983 issue of Behavioral and Brain Sciences (I don't know which
>issue specifically).  [...]

Read it when it came out.  I've sat in on Searle's lectures on this
subject, (as well Dreyfus') but it still bothers me, because I can't
seem to get my question about a counter-example answered to my
satisfaction. And it's a question, I think, worth pursuing.

 >Or, you could go to comp.ai.philosophy, [...]

Yikes! I'll stay here. 

Charles Neveu    neveu@milo.berkeley.edu
Neurology Unit
U.C. Berkeley