Article View: sci.cognitive
Article #376Re: John Searle
From: Charles Neveu
Date: Sat, 12 Dec 1992 06:29
Date: Sat, 12 Dec 1992 06:29
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michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes: >In article <1992Dec10.003409.12095@cs.su.oz.au> danny@cs.su.oz.au (Danny) writes: >>Basically I fail to see any reason whatsoever that the material out of >>which something is made needs to be considered when deciding whether it >>has intentional properties. >Indeed, since you are invoking Dennett you must be an instrumentalist >about intentionality, in which case the only "deciding" to be done is on >the basis of utility of the ascription, and not ontological fact. Searle >is a realist about intentionality - he believes that there is fact of >the matter whether something has it or not. Right! And he believes that the CR doesn't have it. I want to know how to analyze other 'somethings', and to be able to potentially conclude that they do have intentionality. So what do I look for? Charles Neveu neveu@milo.berkeley.edu Neurology Unit UCBerkeley
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Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!spool.mu.edu!umn.edu!csus.edu!netcom.com!capmkt!charles From: charles@capmkt.COM (Charles Neveu) Newsgroups: sci.cognitive Subject: Re: John Searle Message-ID: <773@capmkt.COM> Date: 12 Dec 92 06:29:32 GMT References: <1992Dec8.004113.27082@cs.su.oz.au> <1992Dec8.171302.26243@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Dec10.003409.12095@cs.su.oz.au> <1992Dec10.035547.27065@psych.toronto.edu> Organization: Capital Market Technology Lines: 19