Article View: sci.cognitive
Article #381Re: Searle
From: Michael Gemar
Date: Sat, 12 Dec 1992 22:58
Date: Sat, 12 Dec 1992 22:58
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In article <1992Dec12.073435.677@cs.su.oz.au> danny@cs.su.oz.au (Danny) writes: >In article <Bz26Fy.ICq@gabriel.keele.ac.uk> csa33@keele.ac.uk (H.S. Nwana) writes: > >>Searle started with his Chinese room argument, then to the Chinese gym, because >>others attempted to prove a weakness in that, then to whatever his arguments now are? >>Doubtless, he will dream up "better" arguments to support his belief. > >Doubtless :). My argument is that he is driven to do this because he >accepts certain beliefs (that machines can't think) as axioms and >therefore has to try and justify them. "Machines can't think" is explicitly *not* one of the axioms in Searles' argument. He believes that machines can think, since he believes that brains are machines (he states this explicitly). What he *does* believe is that machines can't think (or, more accurately, possess semantics) purely on the basis of their formal structure, and this belief is itself derived from the axioms I provided in another posting. - michael
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Newsgroups: sci.cognitive Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!utcsri!psych.toronto.edu!michael From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) Subject: Re: Searle Message-ID: <1992Dec12.230319.23885@psych.toronto.edu> Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto Date: Sat, 12 Dec 1992 22:58:05 GMT Lines: 19