Article View: sci.cognitive
Article #390John Searle and physics
From: Danny
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1992 00:33
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1992 00:33
13 lines
1086 bytes
1086 bytes
Hmmm... Searle thinks that consciousness is not just result of the *structure* of the brain but the result of the *material* out of which the brain is made. Now if you look at modern physics, it seems more and more likely that there is no such thing as material substance - that everything is some kind of structure, that a formal mathematical description is the ONLY meaningful way of looking at the universe. This would seem to pose some serious problems for Searle's argument. If the universe is "purely syntactic" (whatever that means), then obviously all parts of it are "purely syntactic", and by Searle's argument can't have any semantics and therefore can't be conscious. Danny.
Technical Details
Message-ID:
<1992Dec15.003323.14505@cs.su.oz.au>Path:
arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!munnari.oz.au!metro!basser.cs.su.oz.au!dannyShow Full Headers
Complete Article Headers
Newsgroups: sci.cognitive Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!munnari.oz.au!metro!basser.cs.su.oz.au!danny From: danny@cs.su.oz.au (Danny) Subject: John Searle and physics Organization: Basser Dept of Computer Science, University of Sydney, Australia Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1992 00:33:23 GMT Message-ID: <1992Dec15.003323.14505@cs.su.oz.au> Sender: danny@cs.su.oz.au (Danny Yee) Lines: 13