🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Dec15.173641.17791@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>Well, to take the old chestnut of qualia, how do you objectively determine
>that what I see as red is the same sensation of colour as what you see
>as red?  How do you know that I don't see red things as being blue?  As
>far as I (and most philosophers) can tell, there is no objective criteria
>to rule out the possibility of "inverted spectra".  Yet, presumably you
>agree that I do *in fact* have a sensation of colour, and that this could
>in principle be different from yours, even though we respond behaviourally
>in exactly the same way.  This is a case of something real (namely experience)
>being inaccessible to objective observation.  I would argue that *all* of
>consciousness is like this.  

OK.  If there are no differing causal consequences at all between your 
sensation of colour and mine then I would argue that your sensation of 
colour is the same as mine.  What's the point in postulating some additional 
property to make them different? (I still need a shave, despite my fondness 
for the Razor :)

>>>This may not be a satisfactory state of affairs for those who want
>>>answers to everything, but it is also certainly no justification for
>>>then defining consciousness in a way that is epistemically accessible
>>>but wrong, as I take it Searle believes that functionalists have done.

>>Ummm...  I'd rather have a theory that worked a bit, that we might learn
>>something from disproving, than bury my head in the sand and say "we
>>cannot know".
>
>I'd rather have a theory that was right, even if it meant we cannot know.
>If you want to "learn something", isn't it more efficient to study the
>"something" rather than an intractable problem?  (You must have supported
>the space program primarily because of its spinoffs like Velcro and Tang :-)

I am not arguing we should stick with a false theory.  I am arguing that
we may at least learn something from the failures of such a theory, the
alternative you suggest is not an alternative: to say that consciousness 
has ontological status but is epistemologically intractable is NOT a theory, 
it is basically saying there is no such thing as consciousness!!  -  or 
rather that there is something called consciousness, but we can't ever know 
about it, so it obviously it has no observable consequences and plays no 
causal role in the universe.  What's the point?  How on earth is this any 
use at all? I think that Razor needs sharpening!

There is an invisible/untouchable pink elephant that follows you around 
everywhere, but because it is invisible/untouchable/etc. you can NEVER 
know it exists.

>>We MUST know, we SHALL know.

I was just quoting Hilbert.  In the context he spoke this, it has actually
been proven false (Go:del's theorem).

Danny.