🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Dec17.015705.630@cs.su.oz.au> danny@cs.su.oz.au (Danny) writes:

>OK.  If there are no differing causal consequences at all between your 
>sensation of colour and mine then I would argue that your sensation of 
>colour is the same as mine.  What's the point in postulating some additional 
>property to make them different? (I still need a shave, despite my fondness 
>for the Razor :)

The point is that there is no *necessity* that our sensations be
equivalent, and indeed, that there is no way of telling if they
*are*.  There is simply *no* objective, scientific way for you
to address my claim that what you see as a sensation of red I
see as a sensation of blue.  This is the problem... 

>I am not arguing we should stick with a false theory.  I am arguing that
>we may at least learn something from the failures of such a theory, the
>alternative you suggest is not an alternative: to say that consciousness 
>has ontological status but is epistemologically intractable is NOT a theory, 
>it is basically saying there is no such thing as consciousness!!  -  or 
>rather that there is something called consciousness, but we can't ever know 
>about it, so it obviously it has no observable consequences and plays no 
>causal role in the universe.  What's the point?  How on earth is this any 
>use at all? I think that Razor needs sharpening!

*No* popular account of consciousness (assuming dualism isn't popular)
gives a causal role to it.  Functionalism certainly doesn't - there is
no reason to ascribe "consciousness" to certain functional arrangements
except for sake of discursive simplicity (i.e., "intentional stance").
*Nobody* who's a materialist has a clue how consciousness could have
causal efficacy.  (This may be all the worse for materialism, but
that's another story...)

- michael