🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Dec18.003427.2149@psych.toronto.edu>, michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
|> In article <1992Dec17.015705.630@cs.su.oz.au> danny@cs.su.oz.au (Danny) writes:
|> 
|> >OK.  If there are no differing causal consequences at all between your 
|> >sensation of colour and mine then I would argue that your sensation of 
|> >colour is the same as mine.  What's the point in postulating some additional 
|> >property to make them different? (I still need a shave, despite my fondness 
|> >for the Razor :)
|> 
|> The point is that there is no *necessity* that our sensations be
|> equivalent, and indeed, that there is no way of telling if they
|> *are*.  There is simply *no* objective, scientific way for you
|> to address my claim that what you see as a sensation of red I
|> see as a sensation of blue.  This is the problem... 

What exactly do all you "qualiaists" mean by "sensations be[ing]
equivalent"?  Under what sort of equivalence?  One possibility is
causal effects (either behavioral or mental), in which case Danny's
point is mere tautology.  Clearly you have something else in mind---
what is it?

-- 
Sean Philip (Shlomo) Engelson		
Yale Department of Computer Science	
Box 2158 Yale Station			
New Haven, CT 06520