🚀 go-pugleaf

In a previous article, axs@cs.bham.ac.uk (Aaron Sloman) wrote:
>This article arises out of recent discussion in sci.cognitive on how to
>distinguish AI and Cognitive Science.
> 
>-----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
>Nearly all attempts at precise definitions of fields of enquiry are
>pointless, because knowledge has no intrinsic boundaries, and the
>divisions that are found between journals, or between conferences, or
>between departments in a university or college, are normally accidental
>products of particular historical episodes, fashions, academic politics,
>etc.
> 
> 
>Academic disciplines are a bit like species of birds: if you try to
>define species in terms of ability to mate you can find groups of birds
>of types A, B, C, D, E spread across a continent such that A and B can
>mate, and B and C can mate and C and D can mate and D and E can mate,
>but A and E cannot mate.
> 
>Similarly there are different clusters of people who say they are doing
>AI, doing cognitive science, doing cognitive psychology, etc. and if you
>look very closely you'll just find lots of patterns of overlap and
>interaction, with no clear subdivisions.
> 
>
reply,

	I don't want to argue for the long-term distinguishability of 
cog. sci., cog. psyche, and cog. neuro, however I do think that presently
there are some distinguishing features of these areas that arise for
reasons having to do with "stabalizing" factors inherent in science.  
refers to self-authenticating techniques that "harmonize" data, theory, and
methods (for more, see recent writings by Hacking).  I think there are
plenty of examples of self-authenticating techniques in each of these
disciplines and hence that this provides grounds for demarcating them.
To make this argument requires alot more space (and thought) then is
possible here, however, I think prima facia evidence for this contention
is provided by looking at the different types of admissible evidence, the
different types of methods (e.g., single-case, statistics, simulations), and
the fact that we can have "theories" of memory in cognitive neuropsyche,
cogn. psyche, cogn. science, and cogn. neuroscience that make little or
no reference to each other (or gratuitious reference).  I think that we
are buying into too much of the rhetoric of each of these disciplines if
we believe that they are trying to develop a unified theory of mind.  

Paul D. Meagher
Dept. of Psychology
Univ. of Saskatchewan
meagher@sask.usask.ca