🚀 go-pugleaf

I've recovered enough to re-read you post. I find that I was too quick
to say earlier that you were "quite mistaken in your conclusions based
upon the limited and constricted definitions which you allow
yourselves." My apologies. Let me say that I think you are mistaken in
a some of your conclusions, and that some are fairly obvious on their
face. Sorry for being rude.

"dog" <dog@dog.net.uk> wrote:

[...]
>experience. this experience is necessarily subjective. there is no such
>thing as objective experience. all scientific fact is explanation, a theory
[...]

Let me try to make a point. Your experience is objective to me in a
sense. If all there is is molecules and chemicals in dynamic
operation, then any experience you have is mere alternate
representation of an identity. Looking at you, then, I should with PET
or MRI or somesuch be able to watch your experiences in an appropriate
representation displayed on a monitor. If you pontificate abstractly,
I see that as well. If all there is to the experience (no matter how
etherial) is complex physical structures in time-dynamic interaction,
then the pictures I see are all there is. Ergo, your experience is an
objective fact. Now, if I turn the monitor so you can see it, then
your experience is objectively represented for you as well. And we can
then both agree that the factual, objective reality is lodged between
your ears.

Now suppose that a brainstate seen on a monitor could be replicated in
another system other than yours. Except for a spatial difference, they
would be essentially identical. Would you be able to be conscious in
two places at the same time? 

If the systems were identical enough and had similar i/o in terms of
sensory and nutrient stimulation, then at least for awhile (a second
or two perhaps) the two systems would remain in substantially similar
structure and dynamics. Why would one system be expected to develop
differently from the other as time progressed, though, and by how
much? Suppose a test was developed whereby the two "yous" were asked
to think of a random act of will, and then perform that act. Would
both brainstates choose the same random act of will? 

Has anyone ever asked these types of questions? Are there refs or
answers?

>> > 3) Why does "the subjective" (in humans only?) strive to "objectify"
>> > itself?
>>      3) I'm also unclear on this one.  Do you mean to say that we like to
>> think that our subjective experiences are somehow representative of an
>> objective universe?  I guess I don;t understand what it means to
>> "objectify" something.  

>me neither.

If the systems of purely physical structure in dynamic operation
produce nothing but subjective experience, I should think that the
systems would be "happy" with this state of affairs seeing that it is
the natural state of the system. (I'm completely unable to phrase this
to my satisfaction, so humor me for a second.) If there is no
objective reality to the experiencer who does the experiencing, then
how did the concept of "objective" come to be? Why?

For example, I can think right now that there are probably states of
existence and types of experience that I can not currently experience.
If it is something like "another language" then I can immediately
concieve of this concept because I have "the basics" to do so. But
something that is incomprehensible.... how can I comprehend it? I can
think that it exists, but I can not comprehend it. 

What makes "being able to comprehend abstract objectivity" possible to
a system which is totally self-contained (if reductionism and
identity-hypothesis are correct) and only able to experience
subjectively?

Jeffrey L. Baldwin
Mind & Vision Computer Systems
"Intelligent Processing Systems for the Energy Industry"
Voice/Fax/Data: (281) 550-4534     (800) MVCSTLM
email: mvcs@gramercy.ios.com       73051.1316@compuserve.com
http://gramercy.ios.com/~mvcs