🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Sep23.182419.21656@cactus.org>, ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter) writes:
> 
> 
>  But I don't think it solves our problem.  Not yet.
> 
>  The way I understand it, Ross proposes to hide a small amount of
>  data in normal text by hashing 40-byte blocks into a single bit
>  using a secret key.  During text construction, the text editor
>  would "beep" if a just-created block did not produce the correct
>  bit; in that case the user would back up and try again with
>  different words.
> 
>  The advantage is that we can get a hidden secret message past
>  the Opponent because the outer message looks innocuous.  Then,
>  once everybody has the message, we just announce the secret key
>  and everyone can unlock the hidden data (the validated public key).

	You are right.  It does not solve the problem.  Every move of the
person trying to distribute their key can be intercepted by the opponent in
this model.  If the opponent can't tell what's up with a message, if the outer
message looks innocuous, he can change the wording of the message thus
destroying the inner bit pattern without alerting the readers to a change.  The
opponent could then, as you said, announce that the public key is in the new
message and publish a key and algorithm to find it (after the distributor
attempts to announce such a key)

	The key to initial key distribution is SECURITY, not just CRYPTOGRAPHY.
There must be some form of communication that is un-interceptable to validate
any such distribution.  For example, after the initial distribution of the
outer text, two or three or the readers could physically bring the text they
received to the distributor for a comparison.  If they are murdered on the way
and substituted by an excellent team of imposters, we'd have a problem :)

	This solution is exactly the type of solution we are trying to avoid,
so I would love for someone to prove me wrong.

					Andrew Springman