Article View: sci.crypt
Article #1204Re: public key interception and translation, etc.
From: Carl Ellison
Date: Thu, 01 Oct 1992 21:25
Date: Thu, 01 Oct 1992 21:25
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In article <1992Oct1.142348.14622@osf.org> karger@osf.org (Paul A. Karger) writes: > >While in many cases, it is possible to detect the fact that >all communications are being trapped, that is not the case if >the computer in question is being used in a dedicated applications >environment with non-computer-literate users or worse still in an >isolated location with no on-site operators, but only a security guard >at the door. > I agree that it's possible to isolate a single machine and spoof it -- although even that smacks of Mission Impossible -- but that's not what was being claimed in the postings which bothered me. It was claimed that a human who is trying to disseminate his own public key can be totally isolated, even if he's aware of that possible attack so that it doesn't pay for him to try to send out a key. It is against that kind of nonsense that I was arguing.
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arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!sun-barr!ames!purdue!mentor.cc.purdue.edu!noose.ecn.purdue.edu!samsung!transfer!ellisun.sw.stratus.com!cmeReferences:
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Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!sun-barr!ames!purdue!mentor.cc.purdue.edu!noose.ecn.purdue.edu!samsung!transfer!ellisun.sw.stratus.com!cme From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) Newsgroups: sci.crypt Subject: Re: public key interception and translation, etc. Message-ID: <6933@transfer.stratus.com> Date: 1 Oct 92 21:25:37 GMT References: <6880@transfer.stratus.com> <1992Oct1.142348.14622@osf.org> Sender: usenet@transfer.stratus.com Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering Lines: 17