🚀 go-pugleaf

 In <BvE5yD.14L@exnet.co.uk> s0rah@exnet.co.uk (R A Hollands) writes:

>Terry seems to me to be saying,"It's a good system but
>there are weaknesses.  What are you going to use it for?"

 Not quite, actually.  I was *trying* to say: "It's a good system,
 and should have almost *no* weaknesses, PROVIDED that it is *used
 correctly*.  I was attempting to describe incorrect usage, and
 show *why* that usage really was incorrect.

 I guess I would like to see public-key documentation put more
 emphasis on user responsibilities.  It seems unlikely that *any*
 system can deliver true secrecy *by itself*; each user is
 necessarily responsible for operating the system in ways which
 will secure the secrecy that the system can deliver.

 Individuals in the US (and probably most of the "free world") have
 very little experience with information security.  One of clippings
 in my files is a column from Insight for Dec. 10, 1990 (p. 28),
 during the buildup in the Saudi desert.  It seems that Iraqi
 radiomen picked up names of US servicemen, and then got Marine
 patrols "to bite on a phony message."  Obviously, proper military
 equipment, training, and execution could have prevented this (and
 probably quickly did).  But normal people in our society simply
 do not expect such attacks, and don't operate in ways to minimize
 those possibilities.  Until people understand the possible problems,
 they are vulnerable, *even if* they have a good cryptosystem.

 (Indeed, I would argue that the lack of understanding of information
 security by the general populace--some of whom must inevitably get
 into critical situations--constitutes a national security problem
 much larger than any use of cryptography by criminals.)


>In the PGP Phil Z compares encrypted e-mail to the envelope we use
>for letters.  Well, you can steam letters open; put medicinal alcohol
>on them and make them transparent; poke in a split stick, wind the
>letter round it, remove the letter read it and put it back.  Should
>we give up using envelopes?

 We should absolutely give up sending *serious* secrets in
 envelopes :-).

 But I guess you mean that the cryptosystem can be less than secure
 if we only use it for small secrets.  I never know how to respond
 to this:  We have to set up a secure link *before* we use it.  Can
 we know the extent of the secrecy we will need in the future?  Can
 we afford to squander secrecy up front simply because we are lazy
 and would prefer not to validate public keys?  I wouldn't think so,
 but I'm certainly willing to listen.

 ---
 Terry Ritter   ritter@cactus.org