🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Nov9.213013.20970@csi.uottawa.ca> cbbrowne@csi.uottawa.ca (Christopher Browne) writes (re: my elaboration of DD's proposal):
>- People may trust it too much.  It DOES have a big weakness in that
>government CAN break it.

Yes, the gov't can break it -- but is much less likely to abuse it if it
knows that a log of all taps is being recieved by the ACLU and the NYTimes
and the heads of both major political parties prior to any session key
being released (as part of the protocol for session key release).


I have nothing against proper police work (although I reserve my opinion of
wiretapping in general) -- but I have strong opposition to Nixon-admin
abuses (or even Bush-admin officials pulling records of Bill Clinton, his
mother and Ross Perot).  All I was trying to do was use cryptography as a
tool to improve our civil liberties by clamping down on the ability to tap
currently clear channels.

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