🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Nov12.042549.11780@clarinet.com>, brad@clarinet.com (Brad Templeton) writes:
> Sorry to join this too-voluminous-to-read thread at this point, but I
> don't understand why people are proposing registration of encryption keys.

So far as I know, the only people who have floated the idea are Ron 
Rivest, Silvio Micali, and myself.  In my case, I was looking for a 
way that would allow LE to have the capability to decrypt a line with
a court order, but not without one.  My goal was a method that would
provide people with more security than, say, requiring that they use
weak crypto or crypto with trapdoors known to the government.
I am not pushing the idea of key registration.  Many good arguments
have been presented suggesting that it would be unworkable, and
then there is the more general issue of whether crypto should be
even regulated at all.  I don't have answers to these questions.
> 
> The implication seems to be that this is to placate law enforcement people
> who want to continue to be able to tap/intercept/read private communications,
> perhaps to stop them from trying to ban encryption altogether?
> 
As near as I know, there is no attempt on the part of LE to ban 
encryption outright and no proposals are on the floor to limit its
use.  The government folks I know all agree that encryption
is essential to protect communications.
>  
> Is this some sort of joke?  Do people seriously suggest such sort of
> placation is necessary or a good idea?  Or is it law enforcement that's
> pushing for this registration?
>
LE has not asked for registration so there's nobody to placate.
> 
> There is no need to compromise.  Law enforcement is just going to have to
> face a hard fact -- in a few years they won't be able to wiretap.  It is
> a heavy price for them to pay, but the other options are simply too much of
> a burden on either our freedoms, or our industries.   I think the chance of
>
You might be right, but let's make sure we know and understand the 
options and their implications before deciding.  There is also a price
to be paid for LE losing the ability to wiretap that I don't think is
well understood.  I have been trying to understand these implications
while at the same time looking to see if there's some middle ground that would
make it harder for criminals but at the same time protect communications from 
unwarranted taps by LE or anyone else.  

> Brad Templeton, ClariNet Communications Corp. -- Sunnyvale, CA 408/296-0366

Dorothy Denning,
denning@cs.georgetown.edu