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Article #1694Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
From: Arthur Rubin
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 16:59
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 16:59
58 lines
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3168 bytes
In <1992Nov13.075603.8557@cactus.org> ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter) writes: > I believe most readers will recall that I have clearly stated, > several times, ***FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISCUSSION***, two approaches: > 1. Require users to register their keys in advance; presumably, > creating or transmitting enciphered information which could > not be accessed by a registered key would itself be a crime. > This could be surprisingly tricky to prove. > This implies a key-registration bureaucracy, and also > supports wiretapping for content without warning the > target. > It inconveniences 99% of the users, simply to allow access > to the other 1%, who would not use registered keys anyway. > Misused, it would also allow "fishing expeditions." > 2. As an alternative, I have proposed that each user be > responsible for providing keys, after the fact, in response > to a legal warrant. Failure to do so would be a crime. _I_ think this would violate the Fifth Amendment. Also, it might be physically impossible, as the key generator would probably be in equipment seized, as well as the encrypted files. > This would be easy to prove, although there would always be > some percentage of honest mistakes which juries would have > to address. > This would eliminate the key-registration bureaucracy, but > *would* require users to archive their keys without fail. > This would inconvenience all users to some extent, and > would make the use of cryptography a serious issue. > It would prevent wiretapping for content (but not traffic > analysis), but would warn an entire conspiracy the instant > a single individual was approached. > "Fishing expeditions" would rapidly become apparent. In addition, as I noted in another message, there is no duty to actively cooperate with a warrent; only to provide the information. (I can't remember what case it was, but a defendant in a government civil case once provided about 10,000,000 pages of documents to the government, saying "what you asked for is in there somewhere, but we don't know how to find it." I'm not sure what happened on appeal.) -- Arthur L. Rubin: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (work) Beckman Instruments/Brea 216-5888@mcimail.com 70707.453@compuserve.com arthur@pnet01.cts.com (personal) My opinions are my own, and do not represent those of my employer. My interaction with our news system is unstable; please mail anything important.
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Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!news.tek.com!uw-beaver!cs.ubc.ca!destroyer!sol.ctr.columbia.edu!usc!news.service.uci.edu!beckman.com!dn66!a_rubin Newsgroups: sci.crypt Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography? Message-ID: <a_rubin.721673990@dn66> From: a_rubin@dsg4.dse.beckman.com (Arthur Rubin) Date: 13 Nov 92 16:59:50 GMT References: <1992Nov11.061210.9933@cactus.org> <1992Nov13.012545.29228@news.eng.convex.com> <1992Nov13.075603.8557@cactus.org> Organization: Beckman Instruments, Inc. Nntp-Posting-Host: dn66.dse.beckman.com Lines: 58