🚀 go-pugleaf

 In <726406434DN5.61R@tanda.isis.org>
 marc@tanda.isis.org (Marc Thibault) writes:

>In article <1060.517.uupcb@grapevine.lrk.ar.us>
>(Jim Wenzel) writes:
>           ....
>>
>>     He was calling  from California in order to pick  up the pgp program
>>     from us. Seems that they are on the case of a molestor who encrypted
>>     his information using PGP. If they  can't crack it the molestor will
>>     more than  likely walk due to  lack of evidence. This  has caused me
>>     some  concern   because  we  have  agreed   (volunteered)  to  be  a
>
>        Yah. Right. Quite a coincidence that this happens within days
>        of an identical hypothetical case being posted in this group.
>        It's probably safe to assume that Jim actually believes this
>        brown mushy stuff, but...

 See kids, this is what you get into if you post to the network:
 People will question your intelligence and impugn your integrity
 in a mad rush to move the discussion away from a telling point.

 I suspect that Jim's case was *the basis* for my hypothetical.
 As I have said before, I got the information from a guy who had
 talked to someone supposedly having this sort of investigation for
 real.  I simplified the case slightly for discussion, and avoided
 claiming it was real because I had no first-hand knowledge, and
 because I saw any claim of reality as being irrelevant to the
 discussion and needlessly manipulative.

 For the purpose of discussing the issue, it really doesn't *matter*
 whether the case is real or not.  It certainly *could* be real, in
 which case some part of our society will not be overjoyed with the
 new world order of widespread strong cryptography.  *This* is the
 issue we need to face.  It is much *easier* to cast aspersions, of
 course.


>        (1) The guy's not a molester if they have no evidence (isn't
>            that what US law says?) It's hard to believe that a file
>            submitted as hearsay (see-say?) evidence would convict
>            anyone in the absence of something more substantial.

 While being *accused* of a crime is not the same as having been
 *convicted* of a crime, it is not quite the same as not having
 been accused, either.  For one thing, the authorities can take
 the accused into custody, and investigate his or her "effects"
 in an attempt to *collect* the necessary evidence.

 You might consider watching a few US cop shows to improve your
 background for this discussion.

 As for files being "hearsay," they can probably be submitted as
 evidence under the testimony of being found in the accused's
 "effects."


>        (2) Why do the police need to get a copy of PGP? If the patsy
>            used PGP, then he'd have to have a copy of it not far from
>            the encrypted data.

 Maybe s/he erased it, or kept it on a floppy which was discarded.
 Maybe it's a box with 500 other unmarked encryption programs.
 Who cares why?


>Could they really introduce decrypted
>            evidence without proving that the patsy had access to the
>            encryption software?

 Well, if "they" find the enciphered file on the accused's computer,
 and it has something to do with a crime, they probably could
 introduce it as evidence.  Do you think it would be difficult to
 introduce a paper diary describing crimes?  Why would it be
 different with a computer file?

 It is always within the power of investigating officers to
 manufacture evidence.  I am not aware that cryptography has an
 effect on that.  If it does, that may be *another* problem we
 have to worry about.


>Could it be that they intend to get a
>            little creative?

 I dunno.  Do you?  You seem to be making or inferring accusations
 with almost no data at all.


>        (3) Could it be that somebody in Cal. read Terry's post and
>            thought of a neat way to put a chill on PGP distribution?

 *Has* this "placed a chill on PGP distribution"?  I doubt it.

 What it *has* done is brought before us the possibility that
 absolute cryptographic freedom may bring with it dangers which
 we did not previously expect.


>        (4) Is it possible that the call actually came from one of
>            Jim's users who's more anal-retentive than most about what
>            Jim makes available on his system?

 Maybe.  But, again, it really is irrelevant whether or not this is
 a real case.  It certainly *could* be real, and, inevitably, *will*
 be real someday.  Eventually, we will have to deal with it.


>        (5) Could it be that Jim's found a poignant way to reintroduce
>            a topic we all thought had been beaten to death?

 The *topic* has scarcely been addressed; what was "beaten to death"
 was whether it was *an appropriate topic*.

 Since this sort of thing *will* happen, we *still* need to consider
 what we will say when such an incident is used to support calls for
 a total ban on the public use of cryptography.

 ---
 Terry Ritter   ritter@cactus.org