🚀 go-pugleaf

One simple way for criminals to safely and easily get around any
key registration is the following:
  1) Use a non-registered "bad" key only occasionally (when really
     incriminating data is sent).  Then encrypt again, with the 
     registered "good" key before sending.
  2) Always reply to every message received that was encrypted
     with the "bad" key, saying that the message was totally
     garbled and unreadable, and could they please resend.
  3) Resend a "sanitized" version, encrypted only with the "good"
     key.

Using this method would allow a competent lawyer to prevent your
being convicted of "crypto-evasion."  Of course they couldn't
decrypt the "garbled" message.  (It was caused by a glitch ;-)
Their own tap records will back up your story.

Given that one can safely and easily get around any such legislation,
the only reasonable objections to it are it's cost and inconvenience.
If these can be minimized, then why not register keys?  Of course,
an equally valid question is "why register keys?"

I don't see why people who distrust the Gov't get so emotional about
key registration.  They can legislate all they want.  It might be
inconvenient and/or costly, but not dangerous to your privacy.  It
might help catch lazy or casual criminals - perhaps even enough to
justify the cost and inconvenience.

-- 
Peter K. Boucher
--
RIPEM public key available upon request.