🚀 go-pugleaf

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 (continued from previous message)
 
 > Remember, we are not the advesaries; we are on _your_ team (or, 
 > could be if we were asked properly :-) ).
 
 Yeah, well, that part is doubtlessly right. We didn't offer enough
 of an incentive. Mostly, this was due to our own enthusiasm for
 solving puzzles and overcoming difficulties. We sort of hoped 
 someone here might share that.  Now, it seems we've been given a 
 challenge _ourselves_!  :-)
 
 However, in our defense, I must point out that no one has excluded 
 any of you from further participation, or from _eventual_ accesss to 
 the algorithm. We just said (and still do) that the algorithm will 
 not be published as a preliminary to this challenge. As usual, what 
 happens afterwards will probably be dictated more by the vagaries of 
 the market, and by our ability to deal with them, than by any 
 technician's work or any test results obtained here.
 
 > However, you would be very well advised to let some of us under 
 > some set of rules look under your box.  We may devise totally 
 > different, and much more effective tests in far less time.  
 
 We have not precluded such a possibility. But we haven't offered
 it either. We just aren't at that stage yet.
 
 > It may be that your system is very resistant along the terms you 
 > cite, but totally vulnerable after (say) a billion bytes have been 
 > encrypted. Well, banks do encrypt billions of bytes and they will 
 > not take your word for it that it is just as secure at the 
 > billionth byte as the first.
 
 That, too, will have to be taken into account and looked at. To be 
 fair, we haven't precluded the possibility of testing billions of 
 bytes, if you want to, but creating, storing and working with them 
 would be a REAL project. Our challenge was on more elementary terms, 
 but if you want a billion bytes to play with, you might get a 
 billion bytes...  :-) 
 
 > I have seen real messages in real, well-broken systems put out for 
 > puzzle solving that vary in difficulty by a factor of a thousand.  
 > If your system is any good, a particular message can easily be 
 > millions of times harder to solve for even a single added word 
 > than a different message in the same system.  There is a huge 
 > variability and that matters; that's why we want to control the 
 > experiment a little more; it is easy to develop a false sense of 
 > security, especially on a sample size of a single, 
 > inventor-selected message.  Or, even a thousand messages if they 
 > all happen to share the same lucky properties.
 
 Short of revealing the algorithm at this stage, please tell us how 
 you would like to control the experiment. WE are not making any 
 impositions. Tell us how you want it. We've said this many times
 before.
 
 > Real opponents are by definition immoral.  We are simulating the 
 > behavior of immoral people, but we have limits.  They don't, but 
 > we may be able to predict what they will do that we can't.  If you 
 > help us help you.  Don't ask us to simulate the behavior of crooks 
 > with one hand tied behind our backs, especially for such little 
 > money :-) .
 
 I readily accept the above words and feelings. No argument. One
 question, though: are you saying that if we had offered a larger
 prize, your "crippling ethics" would be reduced and your ability
 to emulate the behavior of a crook would be enhanced?  ;-)
 How pragmatic! But mixing pragmatism and ethics seems peculiar. 
 Those two don't work together.
 
 >..... it isn't important to you whether you defeat us. It is 
 > helpful, a little; but not necessarily _disposative_, which is 
 > what you want.
 
 I am not trying to defeat you. Rather, some of you seem to be intent 
 on defeating me, rather than my challenge.  And no, no one said it 
 would be taken as dispositive. We just wanted to know whether you 
 could decrypt ONE single, short English word among thousands. Can 
 you, mon ami?
 

--- Maximus 2.00