🚀 go-pugleaf

Writes rschnapp@metaflow.com (Russ Schnapp):
 
 > I think you are discounting time value here.  The cryptologists 
 > who hang out here are probably not terribly interested in carrying 
 > out even a known plaintext attack on something encrypted with an 
 > unknown algorithm -- they just don't have the time to waste.  
 
 Well, if that's the case, then that's the case! :-(  I just thought 
 they might be thrilled at the opportunity.  I know I would've been. 
 
 
 > They would much rather look at and analyze the algorithm in order 
 > to assess its characteristics (security, speed, patent 
 > infringement, etc.).
 
 Eh, sure, of course they would.  But we can do the speed tests 
 ourselves and search the patents also. We only wanted to know whether
 anyone here could decrypt our test file.
 
 Data encryption is not a theoretical exercise.  If the purpose of 
 cryptoanalysis had been limited to pontificating on known algorithms,
 life would be sweet and simple, wouldn't it? 
 
 > To assert a NIH attitude is absurd, given that there is no _here_ 
 > here. 
 
 Oh yes, there is!  Gosh, we even have a FAQ post and everything...
 We have people who support each other against newcomers.  There is a
 remarkable solidarity among the "in" crowd.  FAQ + solidarity 
 creates a definite "here" place.  Don't you think?  ;-)
 
 
 > The problem is that neophytes show up with "unbreakable" code 
 > challenges in sci.crypt on a regular basis (about every other 
 > month, or so). 
 
 Really? I'll take your word for it, although I've been reading 
 this newsgroup for a while and have not seen a large number of 
 such challenges.
 
 
 > If your friend is truly interested in having experts assess the 
 > security of this algorithm, s/he must submit the _algorithm_ to 
 > the experts -- not the _output_ of the algorithm.
 
 We certainly don't want to do that. The output is the challenge,
 not the algorithm. 
 

--- Maximus 2.00