🚀 go-pugleaf

(part 2)

AND... {From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight)}

>I think Jerry Leichter misses the point when he argues that there's
 no inherent right to privacy in the context of this discussion of
 cryptography, in the Fourth Amendment.

>That amendment gives an absolute right to security in one's "papers"
 unless a duly executed warrant based on probable cause is executed.
 It does not say one has to be insecure in case a warrant is presented.
 Thus one is entitled to absolute communications security, and if
 a warrant is presented, one is (legally) compelled to furnish the
 plaintext.

AND... {From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)}

>Yes!  When a person's property is being searched, the police must present
 the search warrant *to that person*, up front.  Black Bag jobs are strictly
 illegal.

>Let's modify the Denning proposal to have each key be held as a shared
 secret (Adi Shamir's 1979 algorithm), with the ACLU and Common Cause in the
 list of organizations who have to agree to use the key -- and a computer
 system which decrypts session keys from the shared secret inputs, never
 releasing the private key -- and immediate notification of the key owner
 every time this occurs.

AND... {From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)}

>Don't forget the (ex-?) director of the NSA saying recently that he considers
 good encryption to be strictly munitions -- something to be kept out of the
 hands of the civilians.

>The issue is philosophical.  Do we have a right to keep secrets from the
 US Government or don't we?

With all of the above said (and hopefully I didn't distort anyone's meaning
too much with my cut and paste edit job), I would like to add a few comments.

Professor Denning said... {From: denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu}

>The government is not taking any action to curb crypto and is
 unlikely to take any such action in the near future.  No proposal has
 been made and no government agency that I am aware of has plans ...

I think we would all be interested in knowing which government agencies
she is talking about.  Care to elaborate Doctor?  BTW, it is nice to know
that at the current time no such action is being taken in this regard.

Continuing... {From: denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu}

>I expect that the next step will be government sponsored discussions
 about crypto policy, probably sponsored by NIST, at the recommendation
 of the Computer System Security Advisory Board headed by Willis Ware.
 That will provide a forum to work through these issues.

Is this Computer System Security Advisory Board the proper group to
discuss an individual's right to privacy?  I am asking because I don't
honestly know.

Continuing... {From: denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu}

>Someone suggested that law enforcement routinely taps without
 court order.  This is an ungrounded claim for which I have never
 seen any evidence.  Regardless, their ability to do this is
 disappearing with the new digital based technologies.  They need the
 help of the service providers, who in turn ask for court orders.

It has always been my understanding (with paying billions out of my taxes
each year) that our government is in a much better position than anyone
else in the world to have the very latest technology available for such
tasks.  Please correct me if I'm wrong.  Perhaps they can't intercept
56K bps with alligator clips!

Now this makes some sense... {From: george@tessi.com (George Mitchell)}

>Now it's my turn to go out on a limb.  I believe that all the parti-
 cipants in this discussion would agree that: When the Government
 can show, through legitimately obtained evidence, that a particular
 encrypted communication relates to a crime, then they can, after
 the fact, subpoena the plaintext of that communication.  What
 most of us object to is having to yield the keys before the fact.

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 . SM 1.06 ----- . Email: john.eichler@grapevine.lrk.ar.us