🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <n0ee5t@ofa123.fidonet.org> Erik.Lindano@ofa123.fidonet.org writes:
>Writes boucher@csl.sri.com (Peter K. Boucher):
> 
> > 3) A person would be foolish to use an encryption product whose 
> >  algorithm is unknown, because the provider might have a way to 
> >  always see cleartext.
> 
> Yes, I have heard something like that about the DES and RSA 
> algorithms. Have you?

I've never heard this of RSA, but during the development of DES there
was some question about the selection of the S-boxes that made some
wonder if there was a trap-door lurking there.  This concern was
also raised over the marginal key-lengthof 56 bits.  But while the
selection criterion used was kept secret, the whole algolrithm
was made public and has withstood attack (in the public arena, anyway)
for over a decade.  And when differential cryptanalyasis was
explored it was revealed that the S-boxes chosen for DES were
stronger than likely by chance, and that longer keys don't add
anything useful to DES's security.

But the point is that both DES and RSA's algolrithms have been public
and have withstood great scrutiny by the crypto field, and so far
have resisted attack (save, perhaps, a few bits of DES).

		--Ken Pizzini