🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <71764@cup.portal.com>, Christopher_C_Lapp@cup.portal.com writes:
|> What was the significance of Coventry in cryptographic 
|> history?   It shows that an adversary can safeguard their 
|> secrets with the home team, long after the adversary has been 
|> totally compromised.  The German Luftwaffe was free to bomb 
|> Coventry and kill British citizens despite the British 
|> Intelligence Service's possession of a complete decrypt of their 
|> plans.  I wonder how many Coventrys are occurring today, even 
|> with knowledge of silicon warfare, value-based cryptography, 
|> and value-based normative empathetic warfare.  The greatest

Probably many.
 
|> danger in giving new ideas to a secret organization, is that the 
|> new ideas will sit idle in some bureaucrat's file cabinet, 
|> gathering dust, while good people die in battlefields and dark 
|> alleys  across the globe.  The way to prevent this from 

But, hard as it may be for you (and me) to accept, this is nothing more than
a typical warfare "engineering" trade-off.  Coventry may well have
died, but the question is, did the British, by continuing to read
the German's ciphers through the rest of the war, shorten the war
and thus make a net savings of British lives, both civilian and
military?  Unfortunately, I think history is on the side of the
spooks.  As I hazily recall it, being able to read the Germans' 
traffic materially assisted the assessment of the massive disinformation
campaign the British were running prior to the Normandy invasion
(they had a lot of the Germans more or less convinced it would happen
at Calais, with Patton at the head of the army).  The invasion was no
sure thing and having a lot of Germans somewhere else when they hit the
beach didn't hurt at all.  Indeed, some German commanders delayed because
they still thought the "real" invasion was to be at Calais.  It wasn't
long, but I recall that most sources agree it was important.

|> happening is to make sure that the ideas are transmitted on a 
|> "risky" medium, so that the transmission is considered "hot", 
|> and the transmitter is never fully and completely investigated.  
|> If the British had had a fire under their collective behinds, and 
|> felt that despite allowing Coventry to be bombed, someone might 
|> tell the Germans all about the whereabouts of the missing 
|> enigma, then perhaps the British would have saved their fellow 
|> countrymen, on the grounds that the beans might be spilled 
|> anyway.   This is the tactic to use when presenting new 
|> technology to a secret organization.

But, I'd check out the history a lot more closely before assuming
your idea really works.  As I recall, Churchill pretty much decided
he'd done the right thing.  Of course he would, since he basically
decided it (not the spooks, in the end).  However, I haven't read a
lot from people that indicate it was a bad tradeoff; unfortunate, yes.
Incorrect, no.  I haven't made any especial study, though, so if you
have other ideas from historians, revisionist or otherwise, I'd 
appreciate the pointers.  But, in any case, I think the blame, if 
blame there is, can be fairly laid at the democratically elected 
leader's door, not the spooks'.

-- 
   Larry W. Loen        |  My Opinions are decidedly my own, so please
                        |  do not attribute them to my employer