🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <7680@transfer.stratus.com>, cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) writes:

> We finally have a benefit to BOTH the government and the citizen from
> cryptography.

Sounds like an unacceptable benefit to the government, and a loss to
the citizen...

> If encryption were universal and keys were kept secret, in the hands of
> the owner only, the government could still perform a wiretap.  Once in
> posession of an encrypted conversation, the Gov't can now prove if
> a citizen's claimed plaintext is truthful -- by applying the citizen's
> session key.

This seems to ignore constitutional issues, like forcing a person to
testify against himself, and the legal concept that the burden of proof
is on the accuser, and innocent until proven guilty.  You seem to invert
this, presuming the person is guilty of something unless, by revealing
the secret key, it can be proven otherwise.

You also ignore the fact that in some protocols (STU III phones, e.g.)
the session key is not recorded in any manner.  These phones are used
by the government, ironically (in comparison to your proposal).

> The citizen keeps his privacy.

Not if the government chooses to invade it.  Such privacy as you propose
is only privacy between users; you discard privacy of the individual
against government intrusion.  That's more than I want to give up.

> The Gov't gains an ability to prove perjury or the lack of it.

As mentioned, by requiring the accuser to testify against himself.
Not acceptable.

> Sounds good to me.

Do us a favor and move to another country.   1/2 :-)

Jim