🚀 go-pugleaf

Having just begun to receive sci.crypt, and as someone who has followed the 
development of PGP since v1.0 in 1990, I have found the animated discussion
of the legal issues interesting, often informative and, more than 
occasionally, dogmatic.

There are a few simple issues on which I hope all might agree, namely:

        1. There is reason to doubt whether PGP can be lawfully used in the 
        USA. Doubt could be removed by *forcing* a test case. But a US 
        volunteer, to risk being criminalizedand financially broken, in the 
        cause of resolving this issue is not yet forthcoming. The matter is a 
        peculiarly US (and Canadian?) one and there is little of worth that 
        an outside can usefully contribute to this North American problem.
        
        2. The export of PGP from the USA certainly contravened the spirit of 
        US law and, possibly, also contravened it in fact. The latter cannot 
        be taken as proved as, in no instance, has the matter been tried 
        though, *prima facie'* there has been ample opportunity to do so. 
        Again, this is a North American matter. 

        3. Following PGP's arrival in the EC and elsewhere, its further 
        *development* and global dissemination has raised a clamour from some
        Americans of, *No fair!*. In circumstances of at least equal dubiety, 
        the first rubber plants came out of Brazil and tea plants out of 
        China. Whether or not the plants could/should have been patented 
        (were such a thing possible) seems an irrelevance. Surely what 
        matters is that, though the exports were strictly forbidden underthe 
        regulations set by acknowledged governments, those governments 
        were (and are) powerless to prevent further propagation however 
        *unfair* and whatever the consequences of the loss of an attempted 
        monopoly. History is replete with examples of similar dubiety and 
        *unfairness*. Re. RSA; had PKP opted to protect their investment under 
     laws other that just US national ones, their case against PGP2.x would 
        be far stronger. It is disingenuous to suppose that the *national only* 
        patenting was just an unfortunate happenstance. What about the 
        similar lack of international patenting of DES? Has any US 
        organisation ever chosen to seek worldwide patents on ANY 
        cryptographic product?

For us in Europe and elsewhere in the world, debating these matters can hardly 
be worth the powder and shot. Whatshould concern us greatly are actions that 
may be taken, nation by nation, to prohibit or licence only on prejudicial 
terms the non-governmental use of any cryptologic protection of transmitted 
information. Many countries already have such laws or administrative 
controls that serve in place of law. It is reasonable to assume that no 
government can view the unrestricted spreadof powerful cryptology other than 
with apprehension.  

Eavesdropping or intercepting the transmission of information is thousands of 
years old. These practices gave rise to cryptography (why else the need?). 
Eavesdropping and interception - whether ornot sanctioned in law - are 
powerful tools in the conduct of affairs of state and also in the 
gmanagement of far lesser lesser matters.

Very good cyphers existed before R, S & A were glints in their daddies'eyes. 
What has recently come about is the conjunction of clever algorithms with a 
nearly universal access to powerful, fast means of information processing 
and transmission. This conjunction, in further combination with public key 
systems, makes possible (at least in theory) a general privacy in the 
transmission of information never possible since God first listened in on 
Adam and Eve. 

And will we all live happily ever afterwards? I doubt it. 

But a lot of Canutes are about to get very wet.