🚀 go-pugleaf

Bruce Schneier explains the idea of divulging pieces of one's
cryptographic key to separate authorities, who can only bring them
together via a court order. I'll avoid the temptation to address the
proposal's details (history shows that regulatory agencies always end
up being co-opted), to repeat the basic constitutional objection to
any scheme requiring deposit of cryptographic key material or access
prior to a warrant issuing.

Under the Fourth Amendment, we have the absolute right to be safe in
our persons, papers, and effects unless a due process warrant issues.
The Fourth Amendment does not say the government may require us to
provide keys to our safes in case a warrant issues, nor even pieces
of the keys to trusted holders, which a locksmith can then combine
when a warrant issues.

Before the government has any right to intervene in our persons,
effects, or papers, the warrant has to issue, showing probable
cause. Since one's crypto key is one of one's "effects" the
government has no right to it, or to require deposit of in in
whole or part, unless a due process warrant has been issued.

There are a lot of smart people on this thread who have been
seduced by the intellectual challenge of devising a "safe"
scheme for the government to violate the Fourth Amendment.
Don't do it--the basic premise is flawed.