🚀 go-pugleaf

karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) writes:
: In article <1993Jan4.090057.20269@netcom.com> rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain) writes:
: >
: >The problem of detecting a spoof in between two ends of a
: >Diffie-Hellman exchange is unsolved, as far as I know, using any known
: >protocol.
: 
: Why do you say that? You can detect the "ends against the middle"
: attack against DH if the parties sign their DH exchanges (using RSA or
: some other digital signature scheme) and verify them before using the
: DH-generated key to encrypt anything real.

This all assumes that you have a secure means of getting your public key
to the other or an authenticated one.  Both seem equivalent in the end
to swapping a secret key to me.  This makes me question the fundamentals
of PK actually.

: 
: The most I think an active attacker could do against this scheme is to
: trick the parties into revealing their public key certificates, if
: that matters.

Certificates, shmertificates. :-)

I have yet to see anything more than endless discussion on this.

Bob
-- 
Bob Cain    rcain@netcom.com   408-358-2007

    'The meek shall inherit the earth--the rest of us will move on..'
                                                    Sameer Parekh


               PGP 1.0 or 2.0 public key available on request.