🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <C0IFAw.3vy@bcstec.ca.boeing.com> vanzwol@bcstec.ca.boeing.com (Ted Van Zwol) writes:
>This intrigues me.  I'm not accusing you (Peter) of anything, but consider:
>
>How do we know the PGP sources on alt.sources (or even that on any FTP site
>for that matter) are "safe".  What kind of precautions or checks exist to
>prevent bogus code from cropping up.  Why couldn't some intelligence agency
>get their hands on the code and weaken the encryption algorithm just enough
>for them and then distribute the modified source to the rest of the world.
>
>I haven't looked at the source or the comments myself, so I don't know if
>this is already addressed.  But, it concerns me.  Who's to say the copies of
>PGP available are trustworthy?  I'm terribly confused...

The best idea would probably be to have an MD5 signature of (say) the actual
text of each post appended to the end.  Said signatures could then be
published either in:
a) sci.crypt
b) Some moderated newsgroup?
c) The C Users Group magazine?

or somewhere such.

-- 
Christopher Browne                |     PGP 2.0 key available
cbbrowne@csi.uottawa.ca           |======================================
University of Ottawa              | Genius may have its limitations, but
Master of System Science Program  | stupidity is not thus handicapped.