🚀 go-pugleaf

 -=> Quoting Steven Bellovin to All <=-

 Govt use of DES

 SB> Definitely not in the U.S.  
 
 >  ..... claim that the cost to the US taxpayer for breaking each DES 
 >  ciphertext is $56. ...

 SB> These appear to be Diffie and Hellman's numbers. .......each solution 
 SB> would cost $50.

 SB> I don't think that that projection has held up.....

 SB> ..... conclusion -- and I agree with it -- is that straight DES is
 SB> probably still useful for protecting individual sessions, but is not
 SB> suitable for encrypting keys. ...... suggest using triple encryption for
 SB> key distribution. 

 My thanks to Steve for the informative post. I admit to being interested 
 in the arguement posted in this news group, more than once, that multiple  
 encryption with DES  - or keylengths more that 56 bits - do not actually 
 improve resistance to cryptanalysis. I don't have the ability to prove 
 this mathemetically one way or the other but I wonder if searching  
 the ciphertexts for identifiable patterns, where the encryption is of short, selected 
 and repetitive plaintexts and using various multiples of encryption rounds, 
 might be an interesting exercise. If only there was time follow up all one 
 found interesting.
  


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