Article View: sci.crypt
Article #3167Re: Zimmermann's responses to Sidelnikov's PGP critique
From: John De Armond
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 22:50
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 22:50
84 lines
5080 bytes
5080 bytes
strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes: >In response to Castor Fu, who has gone to some trouble to id >Sidelnikov, as I've said in my e-mail to him (dunno if I've posted >this or not), I received e-mail from a Russian at one of the most >reputable U.S. Universities whose bona fides seem genuine, who says he >knows Sidelnikov, has met him in Moscow, and he is who he says he is. >Whether the Sidelnikov message is a spoof or not isn't known, but the >history of its posting (first to an internal Russian network, then >forwarded by a Latvian to us) seems to suggest Sidelnikov's bona fides >had ample opportunity to be questioned in Russia and Latvia, and >apparently were not. >Unless you think the Latvian poster made it all up. >Well, there's no point in arguing about it--the warning is there and >may be ignored, accepted, or used as a tip to attempt independent >verification of the claims. Dave, do you see that little glow in the corner of your eye? That's your credibility dissipation light glowing brightly. (to steal from some movie or the other.) Your unrestrained and illogical campaigning for PKP is now costing you credibility on an issue people should be paying attention to. My contacts with ex-soviet nuclear colleagues also indicates Dr. Sidelnilov is who he says he is. I have sent old-fashioned paper mail to someone in Russia who will absolutely confirm or deny Dr. Sidelnilov's credentials but the answer will likely come too late for this debate. As to the claim that if Dr. Sidelnilov was part of the old Soviet government, he would not be talking, that is complete rubbish. As a nuke who is active on the net and who helped through private channels during Chernobyl, I have been contacted by people in the ex-Soviet weapons programs who I only knew by reputation in the literature, offering just about anything I wanted in return for money and/or US employment. Anyone who thinks high level military information from the ex-SU is not available to just about anyone is fooling themselves. It feels strange to be able to know more about Soviet atomic weapons than I do about my own country's. My position on PGP and the private use of crypto technology should be quite clear to the reader from my past sparring with Sternglass and ilk. Nontheless, the display of kneejerking I've read in this thread has been most dismaying. Dr. Sidelnilov has been attacked for for the imperfect English translation, for criticizing the sacred PGP, for not entering into a debate in this forum even though it was quite clear that the posting was a translation from a local SU net and various and sundry other items. What I have NOT read is anyone taking his analysis and trying to confirm or deny its validity. The messenger has been attacked but not the message. Is this really what science had degenerated to? Namecalling? Where is the philosophy that any crypto system should be suspected until exhaustively proven secure in the state of the art environment that exists at the moment? Is the thought of sticking it in the eye of the NSA, PKP and Commerce Department so overwhelmingly appealing that all consideration of PGP's weaknesses are buried? For that matter, how do we know for sure that IDEA or even PGP itself is not a flawed product of the intelligence community, planted as an underground product to ensure its use by those most likely to do something of interest by the government? Saying you know Zimmerman or whomever does not count, of course. If one is going to use crypto for something where it really matters that the materials be kept secret, one must address these questions. I'm not a crypto expert and so must rely on others who are for the analysis of PGP and other schemes. My reading of Dr Sidelnilov's analysis is that what he says is reasonable. Whether it is correct or not must come from someone else, someone who I hope will forget the personal attacks and analyze the problem. At this point what he says makes AT LEAST as much sense as the so-far unsubstantiated claims that NSA weakened DES intentionally. Could we for a moment quit worrying about credentials and take a look at the issue? Thanks, John -- John De Armond, WD4OQC |Interested in high performance mobility? Performance Engineering Magazine(TM) | Interested in high tech and computers? Marietta, Ga | Send ur snail-mail address to jgd@dixie.com | perform@dixie.com for a free sample mag Need Usenet public Access in Atlanta? Write Me for info on Dixie.com.
Technical Details
Message-ID:
<!q5rnkk@dixie.com>Path:
arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!swrinde!emory!rsiatl!jgdReferences:
<1993Jan12.015235.18648@netcom.com>Show Full Headers
Complete Article Headers
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security.pgp Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!swrinde!emory!rsiatl!jgd From: jgd@dixie.com (John De Armond) Subject: Re: Zimmermann's responses to Sidelnikov's PGP critique Message-ID: <!q5rnkk@dixie.com> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 93 22:50:51 GMT Organization: Dixie Communications Public Access. The Mouth of the South. References: <1993Jan12.015235.18648@netcom.com> Lines: 84