🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Nov01.233637.138278@watson.ibm.com>, uri@watson.ibm.com (Uri Blumenthal,35-016,8621267,) writes:
>>>{From: denning@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu}
>>>The reason I made the proposal is because I am concerned that we
>>>  may be facing a major crisis in law enforcement.  I expect many of
>>>  you will say "that's wonderful" but I don't see it that way.
>>> 
>> [BTW, I wonder what leads the Professor to believe that many of us will
>> say "that's wonderful".  I didn't think Usenet was an underground BBS!]
> 
> Smiley to the second responder (:-).

I apologize for the insult.  What led me to say what I said was that 
many people had said things that I interpreted as disrespectful of
all law enforcement.
 
> Now, I'm really curious, why Ms. Denning suddently becomes concerned 
> with what she calls "a major crisis in law enforcement".  Since when 
> did  inability of law enforcement  to eavesdrop on anybody's private 
> communications at their whim, become a "crisis"?

The word "crisis" is probably too strong.  But let me elaborate on the 
effect of COURT-AUTHORIZED taps.  According to the FBI, they have been
essential in preventing serious criminal activity including organized 
crime, drug trafficking, extortion, terrorism, kidnaping, and murder.  
During the period 1985-1991, court-ordered electronic surveillance 
conducted by the FBI alone led to 7,324 convictions, almost $300 
million in fines being levied, over $750 million in recoveries, 
restitutions, and court-ordered forfeitures, and close to $2 billion in 
prevented potential economic loss.  Since the FBI conducts fewer than 1/3 of 
all court-ordered intercepts, total benefits by all law enforcement 
agencies is considerably higher.  Intercepts have played a major 
role in combatting organized crime.  According to the 1986 President's 
Commission on Organized Crime, OC reduces the output of the U.S. 
economy by $18.2 billion a year (1986 dollars), cost 414,000 jobs, 
raise consumer prices by 0.3%, and lower per capita personal income by 
$77.22.  According to the FBI, the entire hierarchy of OC has been 
neutralized or destabilized through the use of electronic surveillance 
and 30 odd years of success would be reversed if they lost the ability 
to conduct court-authorized electronic surveillance.  In 1988 David
Williams of GAO testified before the Senate that "Evidence gathered 
through electronic surveillance has had a devasting impact on OC."  According 
to the FBI, electronic surveillance has been critical in identifying 
and then dismantling major drug trafficking organizations.  Although
the benefits are hard to quantify, in 1988 the Public Health Service
estimated the health, labor, and crime costs of drug abuse at $58.3
billion.  The FBI also uses electronic surveillance to investigate
government corruption.  The "Ill-Wind" case involving the persons
in the DoD and defense contractors has so far led to 55 convictions
and over $500 million in fines etc.  The use of electronic 
surveillance has prevented several terrorist attacks, including the
bombing of a foreign consulate in the US and a rocket attack against
a US ally.

Wiretapping yields evidence that is considerably more reliable than 
that obtained from other methods such as informants, and is less
dangerous for law enforcers than breaking and entering to install
bugs in homes or offices.  I recently had the good fortune to hear
Ed Tufte give a talk (author of "The Visual Display of Quantitative
Information").  He had a chart that showed why the jury acquitted John
Gotty at one of his trials.  The chart was a list of all the 
informants and the crimes they had committed.  How could the jury 
believe the evidence with that chart?  Electronic surveillance was
essential in the ultimate conviction of Gotty and other OC leaders.  

Nevertheless, wiretapping is not used much because the law requires 
that law enforcers show that other methods have been
tried and have failed (or would be likely to fail) and because it is
expensive.  The average cost of a wiretap in 1991 was $45K.  Most
of this goes to labor.  Those of you who think that law enforcers
are likely to start tapping everyone with or without a warrant need
to do a reality check on cost and government budgets.  Assuming there
are about 100 million lines, the total cost to listen in on them
all would be $4.5 trillion!

If law enforcement loses the ability to conduct court-authorized 
taps, they will have to use other means if even possible, such as
breaking and entering.  This is not necessarily better in terms of
protecting liberties and privacy.
 
> that for each "suspect" personally, instead of just keying in some 
> code words to your computer  to pick up anything on anybody, be 
> called "a major crisis in law enforcement"?!   Well, if yes - 
> it's not the law they are officially supposed to enforce!

Law enforcers are not asking for the ability to activate taps from
a computer.  The Digital Telephony proposal states clearly that 
the service providers are to activate the taps -- with a court
order -- and then route the bits to law enforcement. 

> Or are you in
> favor of "surveillance" on much larger scale? Something
> nationwide, rather than on case-to-case basis?
> 
> Regards,
> Uri

Thank you for the opportunity to clarify this possible misunderstanding. 
I am absolutely opposed to any form of large scale surveillance.  I
do believe in the process of getting warrants and I do support 
wiretapping when a warrant has been obtained.  I am not in favor
of relaxing the requirements to get a warrant.  I don't remember the
details, but at least an FBI agent must go through several levels
within the agency to get a warrant before that is even taken to
a judge.

I believe I said this before, but let me remind everyone that the
government has not proposed that keys be registered.  I believe that
Ron Rivest was the first to make this suggestion.  I made it at the 
NCSC and Silvio Micali has come up with a scheme that is even more
foolproof.  I do not know if any government agency will pick up
on our suggestion or if they'll suggest another.  Are there other
approaches that would give you greater assurance against the
government and still allow for meeting the legitimate needs of
law enforcement?  If so, I'd love to hear them.

Dorothy Denning
denning@cs.georgetown.edu